Transcriptions » Recently created summaries of historical documents

• Unload the goods from the ship for that trading post
• Return to report findings and observations

• The orders regarding unloading the ship and the voyage of the Radja of Baros would be cancelled
• All remaining trade goods, collected products, equipment, artillery and ammunition should be loaded onto the small vessel
• The Radja of Baros and his leaders should be informed on behalf of the High Indian Government in Batavia that because they, especially the Radja, had failed several times to fulfill their duties as an ally, the Dutch Company no longer considered itself obligated to maintain the alliance with him
• Upon departure of the last man, the fortifications should be blown up with gunpowder
• The buildings and houses should be set on fire
• All personnel should come aboard the mentioned ship and return as quickly as possible

Van der Burg sent a letter to the high authorities dated 5 April 1773.

The following documents were included:

• A copy of a letter from Governor Van der Burg to the Sultan dated 6 February 1773
• A letter to Soeboehoenang dated 25 February 1773
• A letter to Sulken dated 25 February 1073
• A letter to Sosalonang dated 26 February 1773
• A separate letter written by Van der Burg to the commander Luzac at Surabaya dated 7 January 1773
• Another letter from him dated 22 January 1773
• A separate letter from Governor Van der Burg to commander Luzac at Surabaya dated 4 March 1773
• Another letter dated 24 March 1773
• A letter from commander Luzac to Van der Burg dated at Surabaya on 27 December 1772
• Another letter dated 15 February 1773
• A copy of a letter from the resident at Oeloepampang, Schopmanhoff, to the commander of the eastern corner Luzac from 30 December 1772
• A checked copy of a register from Java's east coast

P. Luzao wrote from Java's east coast on 5 April 1773. At that moment he received a message about a distribution from Noessa through a copy of a letter from postmaster Steenbergen at Gitten. He sent a copy of this letter to the Commissioner at Adirogo and told him that if the boats were not there, he should respond in a friendly way to invitations to submit.

In response to a letter from 27th of the previous month which was delivered on the 10th of this month by a merchant from Sourabaya, Luzao answered that he had not yet been able to accomplish anything good. He had already responded to a letter from the 17th of the previous month on the 30th. He kept the regent Pafanagara friendly and made sure that the people who had gathered from the area around Cotta were divided among the villages under their leaders to continue farming. Pafanagara would travel to Samarang to request his confirmation as regent, as requested by the governor. The governor wanted to speak with him personally about his districts and people, which pleased the regent very much. The regent was now busy placing the people. Luzao heard secretly that great preparations were being made for this journey.

Luzao hoped that by the time Pafanagara left, someone suitable could be found among the people from Balemboan who were on Madura to be trusted with the leadership over this difficult people. He would let the regent leave under the mentioned excuse without giving him anything.

Quartermaster Perk arrived safely with his cargo belonging to quartermaster Alberts. Luzao had no other information about the third boat under a sailor except that it had to turn back towards the coast. Quartermaster De Gelder also arrived safely with his 3 boats loaded with provisions and was already being unloaded as quickly as possible. Luzao let him return with the 2 boats from Pamacassang and their sailors because the west winds were already starting to come through and the journey would otherwise become difficult. He sent back the boat that belonged there, along with the sick ensign and a European servant who had been given permission by the head of the expedition to accompany him.

Regarding the treatment of this people, Luzao made every effort according to the instructions from the high authorities and the governor and director. He told the regent and other native leaders to work in the friendliest way possible. According to reports received in recent days, there was new hope that the people from Balemboan, Bappa Larat and Endo, could still be brought under control, partly through the oldest woman with a child of Bappa Endo who was brought to him on the 9th of this month by the Hebbe officials.

• On 5 April 1773, P. Luzac wrote a letter from Java's east coast.
• He confirmed receiving letters dated 21st and 24th of that month.
• He reported that instructions regarding the positions of local officials in Balambangan, Lamadjang, Sanaroekan, and Malang had been shared for observation.
• Information about an expedition was given to Captain Lieutenant Heinrich.
• On that day, local forces departed for Balambangan, consisting of:
  • Madurese leaders Brajasinga and Sirnataka
  • 7 common officials
  • 60 Madurese soldiers with muskets
  • 440 soldiers with pikes
• He included a copy of a letter from a commander dated 30 December 1772.
• He reported that local forces were mostly sick, the people from Sumanap had returned home under Heinrich, and the Madurese had all deserted.
• According to an enclosed strength report from Adirogo, ensign Fisser received little support from Surabaya, Sidayu, and Pasuruan.
• He therefore quickly arranged for reinforcements from Sumanap, which he expected had already been dispatched.
• He did not expect any attacks from Nusa on the Javanese coast and saw little remaining danger from Baju.
• He requested permission to keep commander Fisser's letter until the Sumanap forces arrived.
• He reported the arrival of Radin Ayu Ceylon and informed about the departure from Madura of messengers from the sultans and the regent of Djipan, according to a letter from ensign Mier dated 11th of that month.
• He had received no objections regarding Wangso Coesoemo and the request from the regent of Pamacassan.
• Ship officers could not safely transport the most important criminals still held there.
• He humbly requested permission to execute these criminals locally and display their heads as a warning to others, as they were otherwise a burden and wasted resources.
• He requested approval to deploy the arrived vessel De Brak and another expected ship to Balambangan to spend the west monsoon season there, partly for show and partly to patrol with some cruise vessels between Cape Sundana and Katapan along the Bali coast.

On 5 April 1773, I. R. van der Burgh wrote from the east coast of Java about some letters that did not contain any information. He was waiting for clarification about how something was arranged in a previous expedition and which article in a contract with a prince was being referred to before he could make a statement about rice. He signed the letter as a good friend.

On 24 March 1773 in Samarang, van der Burgh confirmed the accuracy of the document.

Pieter Luzac, who held a position of authority, wrote from Soerabaja on 27 December 1772. He had received a separate letter dated 15 December containing an extract from a letter from the high authorities dated 9 December 1772. Most of the content concerned Balemboangang, so he immediately sent a full copy to the resident there. He was waiting to hear about dealings with the temporary regent of Jaxanagara. Since he had nothing important to report at that time, he respectfully signed the letter as an obedient servant.

In response to separate letters dated 21 December and 24 December, he confirmed receiving the instructions from the authorities' letter of 9 December. The instructions concerned the customs posts at Balemboangang, Lamadjang, Panaroekan, and Malang, which he forwarded to the relevant officials. He also provided extracts to captain lieutenant Heinrich about the expedition. On that same day, an expedition force was organized consisting of Madurese leaders Braja Singa and Sianataka, 7 common officers, 60 Madurese musketeers, and 440 pikemen, along with their provisions.

Another copy of a letter from the same authority was dated 30 December 1772.

On 5 April 1773, a letter was sent from Java's east coast. The writer stated he would wait for further explanation to support certain opinions, and hoped to find another person for an unspecified task. He expressed regret about the poor condition of the crew of a boat called the pantjallang, as he could not replace them with other sailors. However, he noted that local deserters could be publicly punished on the parade ground with cane beatings to discourage them from running away.

The writer was disappointed that a detachment under ensign Dijkman, which had been searching for rebel leaders Bappa Larat, Bappa Endo, Pa Som, Promp, and Wilondo, had returned without finding anything. Since a group of rebels had been discovered near the Klonkong river, showing they still had supporters, it was clear that complete peace could not be expected until all rebels were defeated. Therefore, it remained necessary to continue searching for them with willing troops to either capture them or prevent them from gathering and causing trouble again.

The writer noted that the Madurese soldiers had long been unwilling and useless according to reports, and their desertion was being overlooked. However, they should not be sent back, as that would give them an excuse in the future. Instead, the writer wanted to keep the option to demand others if necessary. Meanwhile, the Sumanapper forces at Adirogo needed to be brought up to full strength, as the 3 companies of Malays or Easterners currently in the Balembangan area were said to be very useful.

Regarding the island of Noessa, the writer approved orders to prevent the chief Bappa Janie from attempting a landing on Java. He agreed it was time to force the islanders, who would not listen to friendly requests, into submission through military force. He found the plan proposed by the Passoeroan commander Van Rijcke in his letter of 25 February acceptable. The willingness of the regent Nitinagara and the commander's request to both personally carry out the plan also deserved consideration. The writer would wait for detailed orders about the timing and method of the operation, including how many troops and boats would be needed, and whether the patrol boats that the regents in the east had to provide should be doubled.

A joint letter of that day showed that important payments had been granted to some regents, especially those of Sourabaija, to restore the land to its former state. These regents, now that they were on equal footing, had to completely fulfill their annual obligations without fail. This would apply this year if they kept their promise to ensure 500 koyangs of rice would come in before New Year from each regent, otherwise they would face unpleasant consequences.

The writer had questioned the prince of Madura about advancing 100 koyangs of rice to his chiefs. The prince confirmed receipt but claimed repayment had never been discussed. The writer wondered if each person could be employed with a couple of European sailors and other necessary supplies, in which case, while waiting for approval from their high authorities, preliminary arrangements could be made.

• On 5 April 1773, from Java's east coast, a letter was written stating that master carpenter D. Ester would soon arrive, but since there was no other carpenter or mason available, local workers would have to be used, and careful watch should be kept on Mannong Cesums.
• The letter was signed by I. R. van der Burgh as a good friend.
• A copy of a separate letter dated 12th of that month and an enclosed copy of a letter from resident Schophoff of Bulu Pampang dated 25 February showed that the subordinate heads of Balembangan were very willing to accept Maas Alit as their regent, which gave a favorable outlook.
• Schophoff described the officials currently in charge after the departure from Laxanagara, namely Dueru Kontjie and Bawalaxana, as faithful and vigilant people.
• Schophoff suggested that the selection could be postponed until the common people and their villages were inspected and placed under minor heads.
• The writer believed it was wise to examine, weigh and consider everything carefully before making hasty decisions.
• Therefore, he would not yet make a final decision about Maas Alit or about the proposed land division.
• The proposal involved appointing 2 regents: one for the eastern part and one for the western part of Balembangan, with the latter position to be given to the former guardian of the second Surabaya regent, named Sumodirono.
• Regarding Maas Alit, the writer would await the results of further investigation that resident Schophoff was to conduct among the common people, including checking whether the 2 mentioned officials continued to give satisfaction and could be trusted if elected, since the success depended much on the youth of Maas Alit.
• The writer would postpone his judgment on other matters until the rebel leaders were no longer a threat, the land was brought to full peace, and knowledgeable people had investigated the extent and condition of the lands, the location, size and population of the villages.
• This investigation was needed to determine with good foundation whether the division could and should take place, and whether negative consequences like those in 1771 could be avoided.
• In 1771 there had been an unqualified decision to separate 8 villages, including Centong, from Panarukan and place them under Balembangan.
• The writer noted that the same Centong was now proposed to be placed back under Panarukan for a reason that was valid then and now: namely that it was closer to Panarukan than to Lamadjang and even much closer than to Balembangan.
• In a separate letter dated 27 January, it had been stated as a necessary requirement that whoever was entrusted with governing the western part of Balembangan, as well as whoever was appointed over the eastern part, must be a native of Balembangan, beloved and respected by the people there.
• However, now a Javanese person from Surabaya was being proposed, despite recent experience showing that the people of Balembangan did not favor such a leader.

• Nothing should be undertaken against Moetsa without their special authorization
• If it became necessary to remove the mandarins from there, permission must first be requested from the illustrious assembly
• Before undertaking anything resembling violence, the addressee should first provide considerations to the writer, who would then present them to Their High Honors

I. R. van der Burgh wrote from Java's east coast on 5 April 1773 and 7 April 1773. He mentioned that they were being assisted with rice from Rawa. When the opportunity arose, all required timber for the eastern corner would be sent at once without loss. He would arrange for a skilled carpenter and copper coins as requested. He signed as a good friend.

Van der Burgh was still waiting for the promised consideration about a new regent for Balemboangang, with Maas Alit being a candidate. He had been pleased to learn from letters dated 27 January and 5 February about the departure of the former regent Jaxanagara from Oeloe Pampang to Costij. He recommended treating Jaxanagara kindly and suggested keeping him there until the shipping route opened, when he could travel by sea. However, Van der Burgh thought it best to keep the suspicious Krinkdono and 4 fugitives to Bali in custody. He also wanted Boedjaar, who claimed to have been a servant, and captain Alap sent overland immediately to confront Alap Alap, who was currently with his master's entourage and lying about everything, so he could be corrected for his bad behavior.

In another letter from Java's east coast dated 5 April 1773, Van der Burgh discussed the escape of the rebel Larat after he had been caught. This did not surprise him but raised harmful suspicions about those responsible for guarding him. He considered it necessary for resident Schophoff to investigate the matter thoroughly. Those who had given Larat the opportunity to escape or had not taken proper care should not be trusted but watched carefully. The women and others from the rebel's group who had been captured would be sent by sea.

Van der Burgh would present the account of extraordinary expenses to their High Honors and request reimbursement. Following the request, he would provide the eastern corner with military support as soon as Batavia enabled him to do so. With one of the first ships arriving on the coast to load cargo, he intended to have the timber currently stored in Japara, Joana, and Rembang for Soerabaja and Crissee collected and transported there. Care should be taken that a full ship's cargo of rice was in stock before the shipping route to Batavia opened, as the regents had promised. The opposite would not please their High Honors, especially since there was no precedent for Soerabaja delivering less rice than during this period, particularly in 1772. As a result, counting the quota for 1773, Soerabaja was now behind by approximately 2,500 kojangs of rice.

According to separate letters dated 20 February and 22 February and their attachments, Van der Burgh approved the measures planned and implemented in Balemboangang to track down and capture the still-wandering main rebels Bappa Larat, Bappa Endo, Pa Simpring, and Wilondo. He very much wanted to hear about the desired outcome. After resident Schophoff had informed about the general opinion regarding Maas Alit as a candidate for regent instead of Japanagara, who was currently in Soerabaja