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The document contains copies of resolutions that were made by the Council of Police in the government of Samarang during the period from September 1782 to February 1783. These resolutions were intended for the Netherlands and were marked with reference number 15.

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The document appears to contain only the number 2, which provides insufficient content to create a meaningful historical summary.

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22 February 1783 The officials reported to their superiors about the poor state of artillery facilities in the city. The existing buildings provided no proper shelter for soldiers and lacked a suitable guardhouse. They explained that it was necessary to keep the entire corps together under the supervision of officers for better military training, exercise, and discipline. Currently, the artillery service only had: This single building had to serve multiple purposes: storage for all artillery goods, a guardhouse, and a laboratory. The officials requested approval for Captain Pilon's project to construct all necessary artillery buildings. The plan included: The calculated cost was 15,389 rijksdaalders and 23 stuivers, which they considered moderate given the scope of work including buildings and canal reinforcement. The officials confirmed they would follow orders regarding the annual formation and transmission of secret signals to headquarters for company ships. A letter had been sent to the emperor from Ceylon. They would facilitate the purchase of yarn for the prince of Bantam. Two vessels from Ambon and Banda were mentioned, and free shipping to the great east had been opened. The first signatory governor had forwarded a letter to the Javanese emperor written by Ratna Wattij in Ceylon to the susuhunan concerning the death of the exiled Pangerang Adipattij Boeminata. Once the Chinese Tan Songko appeared before them, they would grant him necessary freedom to purchase the approved quantity of 155,000 strands of cotton yarn on Java for the king of Bantam. They would help facilitate this authorized representative. They expressed gratitude for permission to allow 2 civilian vessels yearly from Amboina and Banda to sail directly to Samarang and Sourabaija to purchase Javanese products. They had informed the Sourabaija officials with orders to carefully inspect these vessels to prevent any abuse of this privilege. They would ensure proper observation locally as well. They also thanked their superiors for notification about the reopening of permitted free shipping and trade among the 4 eastern governments, and regarding matters from 1782.
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The governor of Samarang sent a proposal to the higher authorities on 22 February 1783 regarding gunpowder storage facilities. Because they wanted to have a significant amount of gunpowder available in Samarang through the gunpowder mills being set up there, proper storage buildings were needed. The governor had an investigation carried out into the two existing gunpowder houses inside the city. Military captains De Chasteauvieux and Hoffman were assigned to examine them. They reported that: Captain and engineer Jan Baptist Tilon proposed to completely rebuild and enlarge the gunpowder house at Amsterdam Point so it could hold 50,000 to 80,000 pounds of gunpowder. Instead of brick floors, he suggested using vaults to prevent termite damage. He also proposed building a new storage building at the sea point instead of keeping one next to the artillery in the middle of the city, as this was considered unsafe. Both new buildings would be the same size. The estimated cost for each building was 3,826 guilders, 5 stuivers, and 8 penningen. The governor requested permission to construct both gunpowder storage facilities according to this plan. Additionally, Tilon was asked to make drawings of the existing artillery buildings and create a plan for improvements, as these buildings were in poor condition. The artillery corps had even been forced to rent housing outside the city.
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Prince Crain Patengalo encouraged a voyage to transport some Moorish merchants who had arrived on the coast of Macassar 2 years earlier back to their destination with their trade goods. According to merchant Buijs's letter, these goods consisted mainly of 18 to 19 bales of cloves, 122 picol of benzoin, 40 to 50 bales of sandalwood, as well as gold and pieces of eight in coins. To compete with Piera and the Moorish merchants, the Dutch sent a quantity of sandalwood with the black beer to Choromandel around the same time, even though there was still a reasonable amount lying there. They wanted to make the Moorish merchants lose interest in this trade, which was harmful to the Company.

The Dutch were inclined to cut off Francisco Piera completely and forbid him from this place in the future. However, they could not do this because of Prince Crain Patengalo, who traveled with him and was a participant in the business. For various reasons, the Dutch were forced to respect the Prince because:

The Dutch especially did not want to make the Prince their enemy given the situation in Amboina, so that he would not be moved to help their enemies. The Prince had promised not to do this or let it happen as far as his subjects were concerned. He could not make rules for foreign traders who visited his harbors.

No representatives of the rebel Amboinese were found there, although there had been persistent rumors for a long time that they had gone there. The King and Prince had also agreed to hand over any who appeared to the Dutch. However, the Dutch did not rely firmly on this, as the Moors were very devoted and loyal to each other.

The terrestrial globe had become somewhat too expensive for his highness, but he had accepted it on the condition that they would not be too hasty with payment and that he could pay with good useful trade goods, which they would allow him. The previous year he had made an offer to deliver a good quantity of rice in Bima, for which they would have sent a special ship, but this could not happen because of the poor harvest in Macassar, where they needed the Bima rice themselves. In the future they would try to come to a further contract with his highness about this, so as to depend less on the Mataram, from whose lands Batavia was principally supplied directly.

Vlamingh had also been to Macassar according to orders, but had not spoken with the King or Prince about the trade in cloves that were brought there from Molucco.

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Cornelis Willemsz. van Outhoorn, the Governor, had finished his most recent contract and requested better pay and a higher position. He was considered a man of good character who would likely continue to serve the Company well for several more years. A decision about his request would be made known before this letter was completed.

On the 8th, Vlamingh had visited Bouton on his way and delivered a letter and gifts to the King. He also withdrew the men who had stayed there at the King's request. In their place, King Mandarsaha, whose vassal the King of Bouton was, assigned 10 men from his own people to help him fight against his rebels. A large number of rebels had risen against him and had moved to the other side of the island. No messengers from the Amboinese rebels had been noticed in Bouton at that time. The King promised to hand over any who appeared so they could be punished as they deserved. It was hoped that the rebels would not receive support from there. Since similar situations might occur again, it was considered important to maintain the friendship with this King and to prevent any estrangement as much as possible.

On 14 February, the flute ship the Morgensterre was sent to Macassar to continue trade there, carrying a cargo of various types of cloth worth 59,914 guilders, 17 stuivers, and 14 penningen. This ship returned safely on 5 May, thank God. It brought back, along with the flute the Salm from Amboina, the following goods:

The total value was 68,133 guilders. There were still 81 bales of fine sandalwood left behind because of lack of ship space. If the pieces had been cut shorter and sawed through, it would have caused damage. Orders would be given about that wood soon, and they would try to obtain as much as possible directly from the first source.

The Portuguese Francisco Piera passed through from Goa to Macassar and paid back his debt of 8,000 Spanish reals to the Company's satisfaction. This money had been advanced to him to pay for the ship bought from the Genoese. Later he returned with a good quantity of sandalwood that he wanted to deliver to the Company, but this was refused both for other reasons and because the Company still had a reasonable supply. He then sailed on to Maslupatnam.

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On 22 February 1783, officials reported that timber and planks were lost during the voyage from their location to Batavia when heavy storms and high seas caused the rafts to break loose and drift away. They argued this loss was due to bad weather at sea, not to negligence or dishonesty. They requested that the commanders not be held financially responsible on their pay accounts, even though one of them, Lucas Sijbrands, had died after returning seriously ill from the main settlement. They asked to credit back amounts of ƒ236:2:— and ƒ374:5:— to the main settlement instead. Under the domain section, they reported complaints from the Chinese Captain of Samarang, Tan Lecko, who leased the bird's nest cliffs in eastern and western Balemboangang. He complained about extensive and increasing theft and robbery at the cliffs, where thieves gathered during harvest time and stole most of the bird's nests. Some residents of Balemboangang appeared to secretly help them, and the remote location of the cliffs made prevention impossible. In 1782, only 30 caddies of bird's nests were collected, worth 300 Spanish reals, while the lease cost was 2,400 Spanish reals plus another 492 in other charges, totaling 2,892 Spanish reals. This created an annual loss of 2,592 Spanish reals. The petitioner requested to be released from the lease and suggested transferring it to the regents of eastern and western Balemboangang, who seemed willing and had better means to guard the cliffs as they were located in their territory. The petitioner committed to paying the full lease amount of 2,400 Spanish reals for the remaining 2 years until the end of December 1784, if he could receive the bonus that the regents normally received from the lease payment to compensate for his loss of 1,900 Spanish reals. The first-signed governor had already relieved him of the 8 percent he would normally owe from the lease payment. Since this proposal would not harm the Company and the regents would likely agree, they requested approval.
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On Saturday, 22 January 1622, the Council discussed several matters. On 16 December of the previous year, His Honor had asked the Council to consider whether it would be wise to enter into peace negotiations with the king of Makassar, or whether there were important reasons why it would be better to delay such negotiations. After meeting again, the Council agreed with His Honor that further peace negotiations should be delayed because the people of Makassar had not yet been brought to a position where advantageous conditions could be made with them. The following reasons were given: It was also decided to speak with the representatives of the English Company about the Makassar matter and to show them what benefits both companies would gain if the Dutch continued the war with Makassar and, under this arrangement, secured free trade for the English in the Moluccas, Amboina, Banda, and surrounding islands. They would also show what benefits the English Company would gain regarding the purchase of rice and other necessities in Makassar, and on the other hand, what damage and harm the Dutch Company alone was bearing, both through continuing the war and through trade in rice and supplies from Makassar, which was as important to the Dutch as to the English and had also been offered by the king. According to a resolution of the Council of Defense dated 22 May 1620, which was considered to serve both companies and was therefore approved, the Dutch Company would continue the war with Makassar and Mataram, provided that the Dutch Company would receive half of the trade and profits that the English Company obtained from Makassar and Mataram to compensate for the costs of the war. However, this had not yet been followed or implemented. The Council therefore decided that, as compensation for these costs and their own deprivation, and in accordance with all fairness and the strength of the aforementioned resolution, they would claim half of the profits from the rice that the English would buy from Makassar and sell in the Moluccas, Amboina, and Banda. If the English would not agree to this, the Dutch would offer to contribute an equal quantity of rice from their own supplies to match what the English brought in from Makassar, so that the profits and losses would be shared equally.
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On Thursday the 10th of February 1633, a meeting took place to discuss intercepting ships from Macassar and Mataram that would depart from Malacca at the end of the monsoon season. This information had been obtained from captured letters seized in a prize ship conquered by Governor Marten Isbrantsen. The council decided to send out ships to the waterway near and around Rimata under the command of Commander Claes Jansen Bruijn. The expedition would consist of: All vessels would be provisioned for 2 months and given appropriate directions, orders and instructions. The council hoped that opportunities would arise to damage the enemy and capture booty. However, if this mission failed, the ships would also carry a small cargo intended for Rimata and Biliton to bring back a good supply of hatchets and parangs (large knives), which were needed and useful for trade with Timor. The resolution was signed by Henrick Brouwer, Pieter Vlack, Marten Isbrantsz, and Joan van der Burch.
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A letter dated 22 February 1783 reported on various goods held in storage in the Dutch East Indies. The inventory included: The writers stated they would use all these materials to fulfill the request that the High Authorities would make that year. The letter also discussed rice supplies. According to records dated late January, the remaining stock of rice at various trading posts along Java amounted to 3,493⅓ coijangs (a unit of measure). The writers believed they could supply the main settlement early with a good quantity if 6 ships were sent to collect it. They requested that first 2 ships be sent as soon as possible to the eastern corner, specifically to Surabaya and Gresik, to arrive before the eastern monsoon season and load rice. They also requested that the trading posts of Tegal and Pekalongan each be provided with one ship for this purpose. Regarding a separate matter, an invoice dated 25 October 1782 from the main settlement had charged them for 39 pieces of mill planks and 630 barrel planks that were found to be missing from the Japara and Semarang timber rafts numbers 1 and 4 when they arrived in Batavia in September. The commanders of those rafts, Anthonij Blievier and Lucas Sijbrands, had been charged with capital advances against their wages of 236 guilders 2 stuivers and 374 guilders 5 stuivers respectively. However, sworn statements from sailors Franscisco Astanjol, Lourens Zonstrom, Jacobus de Meij, and Matthijs Klein were being submitted, though the text cuts off before explaining the content of these statements.
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On 22 February 1783, a report was submitted regarding responses that had been received and were still expected to come in. The explanation for the delay in accountability was excused, as the authorities were asked to review the accompanying report. Because they did not have enough supplies themselves, they could not provide the still needed 200 picols of bar iron and 176 picols of nails. Therefore, they gave permission to the Resident of Rembang, based on his proposal and offer sent in an extract of his letter, to purchase these items privately at the recently quoted prices of 14 guilders 17 stuivers 8 penningen for iron and 16 guilders per picol for nails. They also ordered him to ensure that the small ship would be completed quickly to prevent the wood from rotting, so that the keel could be sent to the main station at the same time as the two chaloupes requested for Ceylon. The answered demands for products and other items that were requested from Java's northeast coast in 1782 and were either fulfilled or not fulfilled during that year were presented. This included a report showing which products the respective regents and heads had delivered to the Company, either free of charge or for payment, in fulfillment of their obligations, as well as what was still remaining at this coast and what still needed to come in during the present year 1783. From this report it was noted that the following items were delivered in fulfillment of the fixed contingents: Still remaining at the respective offices ready for shipment were: The contingents that were to come in during 1783 consisted of: Therefore, if everything came in and was paid for, the following amounts would be shipped in 1783 after deducting what was needed for household use and for the service of the shipyards and mills on Java, both in rice and woodwork:
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On 22 February 1783, several ships transported goods, but some items were not loaded. The unloaded cargo included: The authorities could not transport these items. According to statements, the ships only carried Company goods and their permitted cargo. Commissioners in Grissee reported finding the ships fully loaded with rice in the hold, salt, oil, woodwork, and water casks between decks. Documents were submitted showing the shipped cash and goods totaled 25,310 guilders and 21,244 guilders 12 stuivers 8 penningen respectively. This included rice and bean rations for the ship crews for 8 months. Four native Pantjallangs returned because they could not continue their voyage to the south coast of Java due to strong currents and high seas in the Sunda Strait. Two of these vessels from Madura arrived in Rembang on 22 February 1783. The ammunition and other goods were unloaded and sent to Surabaya for further accounting, as these small vessels belonged in the Eastern Corner region. A request was made that these goods be credited. Two Madurese Lieutenants named Sara Tota and Salam, along with a sergeant, a corporal, and 9 common soldiers (instead of 11) arrived with the Pantjallangs. They had recently returned from Ceylon to Batavia on the ship Overduin. Following orders, they were discharged from the Company's service and sent to Madura. The Rembang Resident Willem Adriaan Palm sent a report dated 28 January from shipyard supervisor Horning. A ship ordered to be built on 12 December 1780 based on the design of the Orangeboom had been on the stocks since March 1781. It had been under construction for a year, built up to the double hull, but roughly two-thirds of the needed iron and nails were still missing. The supervisor requested these materials, warning that without them the ship, exposed to wind and rain, risked rotting at the seams and internal timbers due to water damage.
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On 15 February 1778 in Samarang, a report was sent with attached letters containing information about pangerang Rongo and where he had last stayed in the Grobogangsche area. However, because it was certain that people were hiding him and supporting him, and they were moving him from place to place from time to time, the authorities were advised not to focus on one forest or village. They were especially warned not to send pointless missions to such places, as these were seen as excuses to win time and hide him somewhere else. Instead, they should generally insist that since Rongo and his followers were on the Sultan's territory (no matter where exactly), he should be captured and returned to the Company, from which he had secretly deserted.

An extract from a separate letter was included, written by the chief merchant and first resident at Djoejo Carta, Jan Matthijs van Rhijn, to Iohannes Robbert van der Burgh, Governor and Director of Java's northeast coast, dated 18 January 1778.

The administrator Danoeridja received requests that pangerang Rongo, who was being hidden in the Grobogangsche district by the Sultan's regent there, should be searched for, taken into custody, and delivered by His Highness to the Company. The prince decided to send messengers from his palace staff, while also including a trusted person to find out whether pangerang Rongo was indeed staying in Grobogangsche, as had been reported in copies of reports and letters. A Javanese-speaking corporal named Klots was then assigned to this task.

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On 15 February 1778, a letter was sent from Samarang. The letter discussed a report from the regents of Damak and from demang Ongo Wridjoijo about a fugitive who might be in the territory of Grobogang or hiding in the village of Pagadangang. This information needed confirmation. The fugitive, a pangerang (prince), was known from previous troubles to hide in the wilderness. Both the emperor and the sultan had tried unsuccessfully to persuade him to surrender when the sultan was still fighting against the Company. The fugitive had hiding places in the wilderness that were very difficult to find. Since people were now searching hard for him, he would certainly not stay in any village belonging to the sultan. There was doubt whether 2 or 3 people would have enough courage to find him in these areas, where there were so many rebels (called Campakkers) that if all of them from both Company and princely lands were counted together, they would be nearly 300 men strong with guns. Time would tell if this fugitive would get help from them. There were rumors that the kraman (official) of Gagatan, Merto Iudo, was already with the fugitive. Raden Depattij Danoeridja wanted to send another mission under the supervision of a trusted person. For this purpose, one of the most trusted officers would be commanded, accompanied by attendants, to find out whether the mentioned Rongo was staying in the territory of Grobogang and whether he was being attacked by regent Sasra Nagarra or not. On 19 January 1778, a letter was written from Samarang by Johannes Robbert van der Burgh, Governor and Director of Java's northeast coast, to Jan Matthijs van Rhijn, chief merchant and first resident at Djokjo Carta. The letter stated that all assurances and promises about pangerang Rongo and his sons had come to nothing. The reports, especially the last one sent on 5 January, lacked any appearance of truth or certainty and deserved no consideration. In contrast, van der Burgh knew for certain that these fugitives had been hiding and finding shelter in Grobogangsche for about 2 months. He was informing the sultan about this matter himself and sending him letters and reports as proof. He repeatedly ordered that letters from Their High Mightinesses and from himself, along with gifts, should be delivered, and that they should strongly and verbally demand the surrender of pangerang Rongo and his companions. They should make clear that any further excuses would be seen as a complete refusal, and it would be assumed that the Mattaram court had bad intentions with these fugitives who were guilty of murder and manslaughter and had done more harm. Therefore, they would be forced to take all possible precautions against this.
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Johannes Robbert van der Burgh, Governor and Director of Java's Northeast coast, wrote to the merchant and first Resident at Djoedjocarta, Jan Matthijs van Rhijn, on 9 January 1778. He found the statements of the Regent of Grobogan, Radeen Tommongong Sasra Nagarra, and the report of the messengers Bappa Ratti and others about pangerang Rongo and his sons not believable but suspicious. The report only contained what the Regent claimed and what the messengers had heard from his trusted people, without investigating themselves or going to the forest Partappan and the village Dawan to get information from pangerang Rongo in person.

Van der Burgh believed that after receiving the letter from the Demak Regents and the report of the Demang Ongowidjoijo and others, which stated that pangerang Rongo and his people were hiding in the Grobogan village Pagadangang, Van Rhijn should make further requests to capture and hand over this wanderer with his sons to the Company. If the ministers did not listen, he should approach the ruler directly with reliable reports. He should make clear that if there were more excuses or refusals, they would think the Mataram court had bad intentions with pangerang Rongo, and necessary measures would have to be taken. Van der Burgh was certain that pangerang Rongo would not find support from the Surakarta court and that pangerang Aria Amidjoijo would not dare to advise him. The rumors that Radeen Soemo Judo had joined Rongo gave more harmful suspicion towards the Mataram court than towards pangerang Aria Amidjoijo, because this Radeen belonged to Djogocarta and not to Surakarta, according to what was said there.

In a separate letter dated 12 January 1778, the merchant and first Resident at Djogocarta, Jan Matthijs van Rhijn, wrote to Governor and Director Johannes Robbert van der Burgh about the remarks regarding the report about pangerang Rongo.

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Wieria Coesoema, who had left the area, went to Surakarta to join the party of a pangerang (prince). He was handed over to the government official Sasradiningrat, who reported this and asked that Wieria Coesoema be collected. On the previous Sunday, when it became known that this Radeen (nobleman) was being held there, the government official immediately sent messengers to fetch him.

In a letter dated 22 December 1777, Johannes Robbert van der Burgh, governor and director of Java's northeast coast, wrote to Jan Matthijs van Rhijn, chief merchant and first resident at Djokjokarta. The regent of Grobogan reported that pangerang Rongo was not in his district. The regent did not mention Rongo's sons or whether these troublemakers had been in his area or where they had fled. The handing over of Radeen Wieria Coesoema was seen as new proof of the usual cooperativeness of the Solo court.

In another letter dated 5 January 1778, Jan Matthijs van Rhijn from Djokjokarta wrote to Johannes Robbert van der Burgh in Samarang. His messengers had returned from Grobogan with a report. Pangerang Rongo could easily remain hidden because of the season and his location. He could retreat into forests and wilderness areas where he had prepared 2 or 3 places. He was said to be staying in the forest of Partappan, near the village of Jawan, which belonged to Surakarta. He was waiting for a chance to launch an attack with some dissatisfied people or their followers, which would equal or surpass the one at Gagatan. There were rumors that a Radeen Submo Judo, who had left the Surakarta court, was meeting regularly with the fugitive prince. It was remarkable that this fugitive, who was said to have about 100 men with him, could stay away so long in forests where it would be difficult to find food for that many people without help from nearby residents.

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On 15 February 1778 in Samarang, Johannes Robbert van der Burgh, governor and director of Java's northeast coast, reported that messengers had been sent to the regents of Djiepang and Grobogang to search for pangerang Rongo. He stated that pangerang Rongo would likely not try to hide in the sultan's lands but would flee elsewhere. He confirmed that Sasra Nagarra in Grobogang would not dare to act against the issued order and would work to ensure the fleeing prince found no hiding place near his district. In a separate letter dated 9 December 1777 from Samarang, van der Burgh wrote to Jan Matthijs van Rhijn, chief merchant and first resident at Djokjocarta. He stated he was relying on van Rhijn's assurance that the sultan was willing to arrest pangerang Rongo and his sons, who were staying in the sultan's lands, and hand them over to the Company. He enclosed a copy of a letter and report in Javanese and Dutch stating that pangerang Rongo and others were staying in the Grobogangsche area, so that the prince and his ministers could be informed and reminded of their promise. On 15 February 1778 in Samarang, an extract was made of a letter from Jan Matthijs van Rhijn at Djokjo Carta to van der Burgh, dated 13 December 1777. Van Rhijn confirmed he had received van der Burgh's letter of 9 December with the enclosed copy and translation of the Javanese letter and report. He immediately sent an express messenger with copies to the Grobegangsche regent to avoid wasting time, and would report to the prince as instructed. The Grobogang regent replied that pangerang Rongo was not staying in his district.
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