Transcriptions » Recently created summaries of historical documents

On 11 October 1701, secret notes from Governor Cornelis Deernink in Macassar were received, detailing discussions about a man named Aron Teecko. These included a recorded conversation on 1 September 1701 with the ruler of Boni, Radja Boni, regarding Aron Teecko's case. Another secret note from Governor Deernink, covering 19 August to 1 September 1701, discussed the correspondence between Radja Gaa and the English in Banjar Massing.

In a secret letter dated 20 October 1701, Governor Deernink sent a message to the authorities in Batavia. The letter included a friendly and sincere message from Paduka Sirij Maha Radja Sepati, the ruler of Boeton, addressed to the Dutch East India Company (VOC) and its Governor-General, Willem van Outhoorn. The ruler expressed gratitude for the kindness and favors shown by the VOC and declared loyalty to the Company for as long as he lived. He offered to act as a representative for Batavia while staying in Boeton and promised to care for any shipwrecked Dutch sailors, from officers to the lowest sailors, since he considered Boeton to belong to the VOC. He humbly requested that his offer not be refused.

The letter also mentioned that Paduka Sirij Maha Radja Sepati informed the VOC and Governor-General Willem van Outhoorn about the arrival of an envoy, Captain Lauwt, along with two officials and their two ships. This information was part of a translated Malay letter, received on 4 November 1701, from the ruler of Boeton to the Governor-General and the Council of the Indies in Batavia.

In a letter from 1880, the Governor-General discussed concerns about conflicts in Wadjo (a region in Celebes, modern-day Sulawesi, Indonesia) and the potential involvement of Boni, another local kingdom. The letter referenced an earlier decision from 23 January 1879, where the Governor of Celebes and its dependencies was granted authority to supply hundreds of rifles to Boni if it became entangled in the Wadjo conflicts.

• The Governor-General expressed strong reservations about this decision, even though it was made under a previous administration. They believed arming one side in a local conflict was unwise because:
  • It could turn the opposing party against the Dutch government.
  • There was no guarantee the weapons would be used only for their intended purpose.
  • The Dutch might later face their own supplied weapons if they had to intervene in the conflict.
• The letter also mentioned a report from 16 June of the same year, noting rumors of serious disputes between Doutongou and Wadjo leaders.
• While no further updates on the Wadjo situation had been received, the Governor-General still saw value in sharing their concerns with the Governor of Celebes. They suggested that if similar conflicts arose in the future (like those in 1878), the Governor should carefully consider the risks before supplying weapons.
• The Governor-General agreed with the earlier advice from the Council of the Indies (Raad van Indië) dated 10 January 1879, which opposed providing weapons to local powers.

The letter concluded by stating that the Governor of Celebes should be informed that the decision from 15 January 1879 to supply weapons was not approved, aligning with the concerns raised.

• On 21 December 1670, a submission and alliance contract was signed between the Dutch East India Company (VOC) and the rulers of the region Voadso (also called Wadjo or Soadjo), represented by:
  • Matrea Lapalili Tomaloe, the main king and ruler of Voadso and Vosbra.
  • Lapadapi, leader of the yellow banner.
  • Lapaakita, leader of the colorful banner.
  • Lapau Nambon, leader of the petole (many banners).
  • Their three Vello Limpoya (advisors).
  These leaders acted on behalf of all the kings of Voadso and were introduced by Nadja Palaka to M. de Jongh, commander of the warship Rotterdam.
• The contract stated that Voadso had been conquered by the VOC in war, according to local customs. The kings accepted the land as a loan from the VOC and promised:
  • To defend against the king of Makarser.
  • To act as loyal subjects.
  • To let the VOC settle disputes among them.
  • To submit to Kadja Kalaka if the Wadsorezens (people of Wadjo) remained hostile.
• The VOC could remove kings at will, and their successors needed approval. Other rules included:
  • Destroying all forts in Voadso.
  • Banning other nations and their envoys.
  • Restricting travel without the commander’s permission.
  • Extraditing fugitives.
  • Following the Bongaisch Contract of 18 November 1667.
  • Paying a war fine of 52,000 realen (currency) in four installments.
• In 1675, the triple alliance of the Wajo kings was renewed by Kadja Palaka, but he kept control of the villages Isimana, Baringan, and Amoeroeng because Warso had broken the alliance first.
• Papalili Nomaloe was overthrown by the Wadjoreren (people of Wadjo) and replaced by Lapari Woesi Dau Mausapa Arve Mampoe (also called Aroe Amali), who was allowed to carry the ornament Kirita Solganrang.
• A series of conflicts and successions followed in Wadjo:
  • Wij was replaced by Patani Saroe Tomo Poeana Lodara (ruled until 1726).
  • Lamatona Losarka Poeaua Lazoem pang succeeded him and died, earning the title Zelaten-ngi Massgina.
  • Laga Ligo Hoesoennja (also called P’alaiengi-baroegana) followed.
  • Lararrae Paeauw Langatgi was overthrown by Lapatouus, king of Boni.
  • Pasalledot Anri-Arae Nampiri took over, collected taxes, expanded trade, and grew wealthy under Boni’s rule.
• In 1697–1731, Arae Seenkang, a Wadjorese prince exiled with help from Arbe Van (Ladalle Poeana Pabola Mapitein), took control of Pasir and Koeté. He failed to conquer Lanjer Massing but later raided the Mandhar coast.
• In 1733–1735, Arae Seenkang allied with rebels in Boni, including Bontoe Lankas. They attacked Lacasa, Kajeli, and Contoli, destroying Bwoolwet and enslaving its people.
• In 1736, war broke out between Boni and Wadjo, ending badly for Boni. Rebels fled to Wadjo, and the VOC governor attacked them with ships but failed. The rebels escaped to Boni and Maros, where Arae Leenkang was named Matoca (chief) under the title Lamadoe Kalan.
• The queen of Boni demanded the rebels be handed over, but Wadjo refused. Boni then declared war on Wadjo. Due to betrayal by Boni’s army leader and council, Boni suffered a major defeat at Aroe Sleukang.
• In 1738, Wadjo installed Daugraja as king of Boni and Aoelankas as king of Goahszee, declaring themselves enemies of the VOC. They attacked the VOC fort but were defeated by Governor Muntij.
• In 1739, Arae Seenkang invaded Mandhar with a large force, but Governor Muntij failed to stop the raiders.

This is a collection of official letters and records exchanged between Dutch officials in Surat (a key trading post in India) and the Dutch East India Company (VOC) leadership in the early 1700s. Below is a breakdown of the documents and their key details:

• Hendrick Swaerdekroon, the director, and the council in Surat sent an original letter to the Lords Seventeen (the VOC's governing board in the Netherlands) on 14 November 1700.
• Copies of letters were also sent by:
  • Hendrick Swaerdekroon, Joan Grootenhuijs (second-in-command), and Jean Diodati (fiscal officer) to the Lords Seventeen on 1 March 1700.
  • The same group to the High Government of Malabar on 7 November 1699 and 13 November 1699.
  • The same group to the Lords Seventeen again on 15 March 1700, with an added note from 16 March 1700.
• A secret letter from Swaerdekroon, Grootenhuijs, and Diodati to the High Government on 14 November 1700, including secret decisions made in Surat between 18 May and 28 July 1700.
• Letters exchanged between:
  • Swaerdekroon and Grootenhuijs (on the ship De Drie Kroonen) and Pieter Kettingh (director in Surat) from 12 December 1699 to 12 February 1700.
  • Kettingh and his council to Swaerdekroon and Grootenhuijs starting 13 December 1699.
  • Swaerdekroon to Lieutenant Ketel and bookkeeper van Breen on 19, 22, and 24 January 1700.
• Translated Persian letters from Governor Daanetcha and other officials to Swaerdekroon between 29 December 1699 and 12 February 1700.
• Reports from Ketel and van Breen to Swaerdekroon about their work in Surat from 5 January to 20 February 1700.
• Letters from Swaerdekroon to Governor Daanetcha between 26 December 1699 and 1 March 1700.
• Secret decisions made by Swaerdekroon, Grootenhuijs, and Diodati on 21 March 1700 and 10 April 1700.

On 8 June 1697, a report described a meeting between the Dutch governor and Radja Bonij (the ruler of Boni) in Macassar. The meeting took place after a conference held in Bontuale on 2 June, where a written complaint from Radja Bonij was presented.

• On 3 June, Radja Bonij arrived at the Dutch castle with two queen widows, along with many other kings and princes from Boni and Soping.
• Eight important leaders, two council members, Lieutenant Schipion, Sabandhaar (a local official), and Secretary Mijerop joined the governor and Radja Bonij at the table.
• The group noticed that Radja Bonij and his people had marked foreheads (possibly a cultural or religious sign) and that he only accepted snuff (powdered tobacco) from the governor but refused betel nut or tea until business was discussed.
• A document in Malay was read aloud with the governor’s permission. It contained a complaint that Radja Bonij had been falsely accused of killing three kings from Soping: those of Belo, Bila, and Pisin.
• The document also claimed that a Soping prince named Dain Mabanij had fled to Goa and was being held by the king of Goa, along with other troublemakers from Boni and Soping.
• Radja Bonij requested that the Dutch East India Company (VOC) officials in Ujung Pandang detain and judge these individuals according to their rights.

The governor responded verbally on 8 June 1697:

• He stated that Dain Mabanij had not fled to Goa but had instead sought protection from the VOC out of fear.
• About 2 months earlier, Dain Mabanij had been summoned from Soping to Bontuale by either Aroe Ponij or Radja Bonij, which worried him.
• The governor and council granted him protection because he was the son of the late king of Soping and had Malay ancestry through his mother.
• The governor explained that Soping was an ally of the VOC and not under Boni's control.
• The governor advised that any wrongdoers should be handled according to the Boni treaty, originally agreed upon by Admiral Speelman and later confirmed by Boogaart.
• When asked if the complaint was officially written down, the response was that it could be answered either in writing or verbally, but the governor decided an immediate verbal response would help calm tensions.

On 8 June 1697, a secret report from Makassar revealed that the Raja of Goa was plotting to restore his brother-in-law, the exiled king To-isa of Soppeng. This plan was suspected earlier in a confidential decision made on 10 April 1696, where officials feared it could disrupt the balance of power between three rival kingdoms.

The report suggested that the Raja of Goa might have been behind the removal of the queen regent of Trowata, which had caused tensions with Soppeng. The people of Boni likely knew more about these events than they had shared, as their growing hostility toward Goa seemed unjustified otherwise. The situation worsened when Goa reinforced its defenses—posting guards, patrolling day and night, and preparing for conflict—especially after Boni gathered a large number of troops near Bontuale.

Another report from 8 June 1697 described a formal exchange of letters and gifts between the Dutch governor and the kings of Boni and Goa. The last letter to Dutch officials, dated 29 May and written in Bontuale, was delivered on 31 May with a gift of 12 enslaved people (10 men and 2 women), considered the finest sent in years. Each was valued at 25 rijksdaalders. The gifts and letters were sent aboard the ship Boswijck with ceremonial cannon fire: 3 volleys from the castle and 9 from the ship, followed by 5 more from the ship upon the kings' arrival. This followed the protocol set in a secret resolution on 18 April 1696.

The kings of Boni and Goa had never before visited the governor together at the castle, avoiding disputes over who held higher rank. Traditionally, Boni was given precedence, and this custom was maintained. Before this meeting, the governor had learned that the court of Boni was holding a major assembly, though the purpose was unclear.

On 8 June 1697, a letter from Makassar reported a meeting with Raja Boni, the ruler of the Boni kingdom. The Dutch officials, representing the Dutch East India Company (VOC), expressed their displeasure over military actions taken against Sopingh (likely a region or group). They demanded an explanation and assurances that such actions would not happen again.

• Raja Boni responded surprisingly well, stating that the Dutch criticism was received as "fatherly discipline" and a sign of affection. He claimed his people found it pleasing rather than offensive and expressed gratitude.
• The governor first delivered the message in the Makassarese language (spoken by the people of Boni) through the Company’s interpreter, Jan Ferdinandus. It was then repeated in Malay by Raja Boni's interpreter, Carre-lessan.
• Raja Boni insisted his people genuinely appreciated the Dutch warning, contrary to expectations that they might resent it. The meeting ended positively, with handshakes and a celebratory feast initiated by Raja Boni, who toasted to the well-being of those who showed kindness to Boni.

The Dutch officials noted that Raja Boni seemed more politically astute than before, possibly due to good advice. His calm response aligned with a pardon granted earlier by the Dutch on 3 December 1696, after Raja Boni admitted fault and requested forgiveness. The letter also included a detailed account of the military actions against Sopingh, as requested by the Dutch, which the governor found thorough and clear.

The original letter from Raja Boni, dated 30 May 1697, was read aloud in the presence of the dowager queen Dain Tahalille and Aroe Mero. It contained thanks for Dutch gifts and support for Boni's prosperity.

On 8 June 1697, a ship from Makassar returned from Chirana with important letters. The governor and the Raja of Bone held further discussions. The ship had left the Bay of Bone on 4 May and arrived at Bontuale on the evening of 8 May around 10 PM. The next day, the governor was notified, and on 10 May, the Raja of Bone visited the governor with his entire court.

On 17 May at 8 AM, the letters and gifts were formally received in an unusually grand ceremony, even more impressive than the one in September 1695. Over 8,000 armed men were present, along with around 90 to 100 high-ranking leaders, kings, and princes in battle attire. They carried a gilded palanquin, accompanied by the kings of Berroe and Laijo as allies. After the reception, the delegation left with the letters and gifts under a salute of 9 cannon shots.

A second meeting with the Raja of Bone took place on 22 May. Around 50 kings and princes from Bone attended, including the regent and the kings of Belo, Pila, and Pisij from Sopingh, all wearing new purple turbans. They arrived at the castle at 3 PM.

During the meeting in the great hall, the letters were read aloud. The Malay translation was read by the royal secretary, while the governor reviewed the original Dutch version. The Raja of Bone requested clarification if anything was unclear, but the letter was read without interruption. After the reading, the Raja of Bone stood, removed his turban, and expressed threefold gratitude:

• First, for the approval of his election by the authorities.
• Second, for the accepted request to protect the two widowed queens (who were present).
• Third, for the governor’s faithful reporting of Bone's affairs to the authorities.

The governor noted that the letter contained additional matters not yet discussed. Since the Raja of Bone had earlier requested the governor’s interpretation, the governor believed the content might not have been fully understood.

On 10 June 1697, officials in Makassar (at Fort Rotterdam) sent a letter to the Dutch East India Company (VOC) leaders in Batavia, including Governor-General Willem van Outhoorn. The letter was received in Batavia on 28 June 1697, delivered by the ship Boswijk, captained by Theunis Ros, with accountant Jan de Molièr also on board.

• The letter included a message from Raja Bonij (the ruler of Bone), handed to Theunis Ros.
• It was signed by Jacob Cuijk van Mierop, the secretary in Makassar.
• A previous letter from 4 May 1697 had been sent via the ship Domburg, carried by senior merchant Matheus Schenkenberg.
• A copy of a register (official record) was later sent on 18 May via a sloop (small ship) led by a Chinese captain, confirming the original was properly handled.

The current letter (8 June 1697) was sent via the yacht Boswijk, which also carried cargo and passengers (details to be mentioned later). The writers noted they would delay a full reply until a better opportunity arose.

Regarding Raja Bonij:

• A previous VOC letter and gift for him were still in the possession of the governor of Bone, as Raja Bonij was away in Cinrana (likely for his father’s 40-day mourning period).
• He had promised merchants Abraham Holscher and ensign Pieter Pietersz that he would address the VOC matters upon his return.
• Raja Bonij was traveling back with his followers in four sturdy boats.

On 10 June 1697, officials in Makassar sent documents to Batavia (modern-day Jakarta). These included:

• An original statement about extra cash found in chest number 9 from the ship Zilversteijn, which had delivered silver to Makassar.
• A response about corrections made for people listed in a recent record from the ship Domburgh, who were no longer present.
• Copies of advice reports from Pieter de Vos, head of the general pay office, regarding payroll books from 1695 and 1696, sent via the ships Boswijk and Domburgh. These were answered by the local paymaster, Arnoldus Moll.
• A passenger list of people traveling from Makassar to Batavia on the Boswijk.
• An open letter from Arnoldus Moll to Pieter de Vos.
• 41 original accounts from people who had been on the wrecked ship Zilversteijn, excluding 5 who had already left on the Domburgh.
• 57 similar accounts from freed soldiers and disabled individuals traveling to Batavia on the same ship.
• 4 ship journals kept by captain Barent Bogaart and three helmsmen during the Zilversteijn's voyage from Batavia to Banda, along with 2 maps used during the trip.
• An expense report for costs covered by local administrators for the Boswijk.
• An invoice for goods loaded onto the Boswijk.
• A receipt for goods unloaded from the same ship by IS (initials only).

This collection of documents from Makassar, dated 10 June 1697, includes records of legal, financial, and administrative matters involving Dutch officials, local rulers, and merchants. Below is a breakdown of the key points:

• A letter book containing copies of incoming letters from 3 October 1696 to 8 June 1697.
• A memo listing the complaints of Raja Boni, written in Malay with Arabic script.
• A report on stolen goods belonging to the imprisoned King of Tambora, along with further investigations conducted on 20 May and 8 June 1697.
• Statements from multiple people about selling their accounts to the citizen Jan Reijnax.
• Copies of two legal documents:
  • A power of attorney signed by the soldier Matthijs Corbosier on 18 October 1696.
  • A bond (loan agreement) signed by the same soldier on 19 October 1696.
• A duplicate report by the officer Adriaan 't Hooft describing events involving the three kingdoms of Sumbauwa, Dompo, and Bima, dated 1 May 1697.
• Original legal documents from a case between the junior merchant Abraham Holsscher (acting as temporary fiscal, or prosecutor) and the citizen Erik Loijers over insults.
• A list comparing goods salvaged from the shipwreck of the Zilversteijn (sent to Banda) with the original inventory and cost report, prepared by Adriaan 't Hooft and assistant Adriaan Broers.
• Original statements about missing cargo from the Zilversteijn, recorded before the secretary Jacob Cuijk van Mierop and witnesses on 8 June 1697.
• A report by the ship’s captain Reunis Ros and shipyard master Bartholomeus de Grote on their investigation of the captain and helmsmen of the wrecked Zilversteijn, dated 8 June 1697.
• A collected list of questions prepared by the ship’s officers involved in the investigation.

On 10 June 1697, a ship named Boswijk left Makassar carrying official documents addressed to Governor-General Willem van Outhoorn and the Council of the Dutch East Indies in Batavia. The shipment included the following records:

• An original letter from Governor Isaacq van Thije and the local council, written on 8 June 1697 with a postscript added on 10 June 1697.
• A copy of political council resolutions made between 9 October 1696 and 23 April 1697.
• A copy of the daily register covering 1 September 1696 to 28 February 1697.
• A copy of the outgoing letter book, spanning 18 October 1696 to 30 May 1697.
• An additional document (listed as No. 5, but no details provided).

On 4 May 1697, a report described the political situation in Macassar (modern-day Makassar, Indonesia). The text explains the following key events:

• The kingdoms of Soping (also called Hopingh and Wadzio) and Bonij had been attacked and conquered by the late ruler of Gowa, referred to as Paduka Radja Goa (the King of Gowa). After this, the people of Bonij accepted the King of Gowa as their ruler.
• After the conflict, both sides returned to their own territories. However, the Dutch—now represented by the governor Isaacq van Thije, who was stationed at Fort Rotterdam—had gained control over the people of Macassar.
• The text mentions a dispute involving the late ruler of Bonij and the people of Soping. After the death of the ruler of Bonij, the people of Soping refused to remain under constant threat. They reinstated their own leader as king, which angered the new ruler of Bonij. This led to an attack on Soping, causing destruction.
• The writers express concern but also approval regarding a contract related to Banggai (an area in Sulawesi). They emphasize that it is unacceptable for lesser figures to break agreements.
• The rulers of Macassar plan to send an envoy to Batavia (modern-day Jakarta) by October 1697, unless prevented by unforeseen problems.
• A small gift of 3 enslaved people is sent to the Dutch Governor-General and the Council of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) as a sign of sincere loyalty and peace.

The document was written and sealed in Gowa on 4 May 1697.

On 4 May 1697, a report from Makassar described how goods made in Europe and transported by ship arrived safely. These were handed over by an envoy to Governor Isaacq van Tije at Fort Rotterdam.

The Paduka Sri Sultan and his officials later gathered all their subjects to publicly read a respected letter from the Dutch East India Company (VOC). The letter was filled with kindness and favors, and the event was held with great splendor, unlike anything seen before. The sultan and his people were deeply moved by the letter’s warm words, bringing great joy to all in Gowa.

In another report from 4 May 1693, the sultan earnestly requested the VOC to allow his people to reunite with their relatives and rebuild their villages. He also asked for support in improving their livelihoods.

The VOC had inquired about the situation in Bone and Soppeng. The sultan explained that these two kingdoms, along with Wajo, had once been united as the "Three Allied Kingdoms." Each ruled itself but maintained a bond of friendship, symbolized by a memorial stone in Timo Urom. Even the late Raja of Gowa had once governed them with divine favor.

On 4 May 1697, officials in Makassar received an unclear report about unrest involving Soping and three local kings, but the source was unknown. The Dutch East India Company (VOC) was confused because a returning messenger had earlier claimed everything was peaceful when leaving Ujung Pandang. The VOC ordered an investigation to confirm the truth before rumors spread to Batavia, which could anger their superiors—especially since Arung Palakka (referred to as Cathagor in the text) had previously acted against Soping in a way that had already caused surprise.

• If the report was false, the VOC demanded Arung Palakka bring the three kings before them for questioning to clear up the matter.
• If Arung Palakka admitted to wrongdoing (even if he made excuses, like claiming it was retaliation), the VOC would formally protest for the second time, accusing him of breaking promises and treaties. They would demand:
  • The immediate release of the three kings.
  • The freedom of all Soping subjects enslaved or captured by him, now or in the past.
• The VOC reminded Arung Palakka that Soping was an ally, not a subject, under their treaties. If he refused, the VOC would not be responsible for any conflicts that followed.
• They warned that his actions could ruin his relationship with the VOC, which had—according to the late king—freed his people from slavery in the past. The VOC still valued this alliance but expected peace among all partners.

If the report turned out to be false, the protest would be unnecessary. Either way, the VOC insisted Arung Palakka come to Makassar quickly to resolve the issue. Local officials were told to:

• Use persuasion or pressure to ensure his arrival.
• Discreetly investigate the truth through trusted contacts without delaying their own work.
• Adjust their approach based on what they discovered on-site.

On 4 May 1697, a report from Makassar described an attack on three kings from Soping: Aroe Belo, Aroe Pila, and Aroe Pisoe. They were invited to a hunt in Tenroen but ambushed by armed men from Boni, led by Lieutenant Poane Wandjian. The first two kings were captured, and the third was wounded. The attackers took them to the region of Tiboeroe (or Timoeron). Thirteen defenders from Soping and three from Boni were reportedly killed in the conflict.

The attack was seen as an act of cruelty and abuse of power against Soping. However, confusion arose when a messenger from Boni, Intchie Djenal, returned with a different account. He claimed everything was peaceful in Tiboeroe and that Aroe Belo was unharmed, even dining with Aroe Ponij, the ruler of Boni.

Due to the conflicting reports, officials decided to send two language experts, assisted by Intchie Djenal, a corporal, and six soldiers, to investigate. The local leaders Aroe Tanette Matoe and Aroe Mero provided a boat to transport them to Padang Padang and then overland to Aroe Ponij's location.

Upon arrival, the envoys were to greet Aroe Ponij formally and inform him that the ship Domburgh had arrived safely from Batavia on 4 May 1697, carrying envoys from Boni. These envoys brought letters from the Dutch authorities in Batavia, along with gifts. The envoys were received with honors and expected Aroe Ponij to come to Bontuale to collect the letters and discuss matters with the governor and council.

The envoys were also to address reports about the attack ordered by Dain Mabanij against the three kings of Soping.

On 4 May 1697, a military force from Makassar attacked Soping and, after a fierce battle, conquered the area. Two important leaders, Aroe Solotangan and Tobake, were brutally killed. Afterward, the king of Soping sent a protest through the Dutch East India Company’s interpreter and later appeared in person following a formal invitation. He asked for forgiveness, but the decision was left pending approval from the leaders in Batavia. The Company insisted he avoid such violent actions in the future.

The situation became more urgent because Goa had recently been threatened by Aroe Ponij from Boni. The government of Goa sought protection from the Company, which promised support in case of an attack. This increased Aroe Ponij’s hostility but also gave the Company a chance to regain influence over time—if Aroe Ponij did not remain peaceful.

In March 1697, Aroe Ponij learned his elderly father, Pakka Koija, was seriously ill in Negorije Boege. To see him before he died, Aroe Ponij requested leave on 23 March and immediately departed. The next day, news arrived of his father’s death. Following a council decision on 25 March, a traditional mourning gift of 12 pieces of white cloth was sent to him.

Eight days before the report, Aroe Ponij had summoned one of his key warriors, Captain Boeloe Boeloe (also called Cito), from Bontuale. Then, on 4 May, Dain Mabanij (also known as Tohane), a prince of Soping, visited the governor with some Makassar nobles. He revealed that Aroe Ponij had left him behind to accompany the widowed queen of Boni. Two days earlier, he had received an urgent letter from the queen summoning him to Boni for discussions. Fearful this was a plot against his life, he requested the Company’s protection, which was granted the same day.

Soon after, Dain Mabanij returned with new information from a Soping man named Torappa, who reported that Aroe Ponij had summoned his warriors five days earlier (on 3 May).

On 4 May 1697, a report from Makassar discussed several administrative and legal matters involving the Dutch presence in the region.

• Dirck Neijbsek requested permission to return to the Dutch Republic because he had served over 3 years beyond his contracted time and had a family waiting for him. His request for compensation for unfair adjustments to his service was approved.
• A prisoner, former sergeant Dirck Meijbeeck van Teskelenburgh, had been sentenced to life in chains in Banda for manslaughter by the Honorable Council of Justice in Batavia. He escaped during a shipwreck near Zilversteijn, losing his shackles, and later traveled by raft and overland with soldiers to Makassar. After review, he was sent back in chains to the authorities.
• Compensation for unfair service adjustments was addressed based on records from the past 2 years, except for those who had died or left. Three sailors, previously granted a 3-year extension (from 9 to 11 years) under the late President Prins, remained unresolved.
• The ship Boswijk successfully delivered its cargo, but 50 pieces of knee timber were found rotten and unusable, even as firewood. The loss was recorded in the accounts.
• The ship Domburgh had some damaged goods due to moisture or faulty barrels, noted in a resolution on 30 April.
• Three enslaved individuals from the Raja of Goa were valued at 18 rijksdaalders each and charged to the general ledger. Additionally, 9 usable anchors (weighing 1,000 to 1,600 pounds each), believed to be from the ship De Flaman, were unaccounted for in official records.
• The third set of payroll books, closed on 31 August 1696, was sent separately.

On 4 May 1697, a ship named Domburgh sailed from Macassar carrying several people and financial documents. The documents included:

• A bill of exchange for Juffrouw Joanna de Cock, the widow of Captain Matthijs Hendrick Zuuring, worth 1000 reals.
• A bill of exchange for the surgeon Jeromimus Josephus, to be collected by his colleague Paulus Sermento, worth 55½ reals.
• A total of four bills of exchange, adding up to 2036 and 13/48 reals, credited to the general trading office.

The following passengers were on board:

• Mattheus Schenkenberg, a senior merchant, with his family, including the son of preacher Gerardus Heij.
• Hendrick Caas, a merchant and former fiscal officer.
• Maurits Drommout from Schiedam, a sergeant.
• Samuel Wisesius from Bommel, a temporary assistant.
• Juffrouw Joanna de Cock (the widow of Captain Zuuring), her daughter, and her son Philips van der Stappen, a temporary assistant whose 5-year contract had ended.

Additionally, the following groups were on board:

• 23 soldiers whose service time had ended and were returning home.
• 3 craftsmen.
• 5 foresters and sailors who were replaced due to expired contracts.
• 1 trumpeter.
• 28 soldiers, including 4 from Zilversteijn, all unfit for duty due to serious or long-term illnesses (as listed in a separate document).
• 6 people from various services saved from a shipwreck, including a blacksmith.

The trumpeter Jaspar van Stakenburg was also mentioned.

On 4 May 1697, a report from Makassar discussed military and financial matters under the Dutch administration.

• The position of a deceased captain, Harman Hansz, was declared vacant. His monthly salary of 100 guilders was stopped as of 31 March, and from 1 April, he received a pension of 16 rijksdaalders per month due to his poor health. Though he wished to travel to Batavia, his worsening condition kept him in Makassar.
• Pieter Schipion, a lieutenant, was temporarily appointed as the acting head of the militia under the governor’s authority until a permanent captain was chosen. He received the pay and benefits of a captain during this period.
• Three ensigns—Pieter Pietersz, Isaacq Alexanders, and Jacob Steenbergen (the latter recently arrived via Boswijk)—were assigned to take turns guarding Colatsraal. They were described as skilled, reliable men with strong potential.
• Two financial documents (exchange letters) were issued:
  • One for 1,621 rijksdaalders and 3/48 stuivers, the net proceeds from the estate of the late junior merchant Ioannes Junius (from 31 May 1693). This money was held in the general paymaster’s office and managed by the executor, Pieter de Vos.
  • Another for 200 rijksdaalders, taken from the account of former jailer (now a free man) Dirck Hoijers van Breemen. This sum was tied to a legal case where junior merchant and ensign Abraham Holscher had sued him for injuries. The court ruled that Holscher must return to Batavia within four months, and the case documents would follow via Boswijk. The 200 rijksdaalders were to be repaid to Abraham Quevilerius as ordered.
• The total amount covered by the two exchange letters was 1,821 rijksdaalders and 9/48 stuivers, including additional transport costs.

On 4 May 1697, officials in Makassar settled accounts and handed over administrative duties. The following changes were made:

• E. Schenkenberg was cleared of responsibility for financial matters after submitting a report on 19 April about minor shortages and surpluses, mostly in paper and spices, which were approved for settlement in the profit-and-loss account.
• The butler Jacob Sandersz and assistant Adriaan Broensz declared on 16 April that no shortages existed in the dispensary or iron warehouse, so they took full responsibility (with proper compensation).
• Hendrick Steenkop was appointed fiscal officer on 9 April, replacing Hendrick Caas, after taking the required oath.
• Moll took over the garrison books from Jacob Cuijk van Mijerop at the end of March, while Mijerop returned to his role as government secretary, replacing Isaacq. Molen Hackert.
• Isaacq. Molen Hackert was elected to the Political Council.
• Matthijs Hendrick Zuuring, a captain, died on 23 March from illness. His extra pay from 5 February until his death was approved.
• Jaacx Jacob Mariner stepped down as First Clerk and Secretary to the Council of Justice.
• Moll and Hackert were appointed to both the Political Council and the Council of Justice after taking their oaths.
• Surgeons Christiaan Bombergen (castle surgeon) and Pierre Dieu la Foj (hospital surgeon) were praised for their dedication and took over from Nicolaas Ridderveld, who had been bedridden since February.

All newly appointed officials expressed gratitude for their promotions and promised to perform their duties faithfully.

On 4 May 1697, a report from Makassar discussed the harvest and purchase of green kadjang (a type of legume). Due to strong southeast winds, ships were ordered to anchor below De Drie Gebroeders (The Three Brothers) until fully loaded, but no later than 20 May, before continuing to Batavia.

The green kadjang crop in the Buginese highlands had failed badly for the second time because heavy rain washed away or ruined most of the seeds. The Dutch had already given the widow of the first Buginese queen 200 rijksdaalders (Dutch guilders) to secure 20 loads at 10 rijksdaalders per load. A sergeant in Bulukumba was also ordered to secure 30 loads at the same price. However, only about 12 loads were received from the Buginese region, and just 3 loads from Bulukumba, where around 50 loads of rice also remained. The lack of small boats (chialoupen) made it impossible to collect the grain, as the assigned boats had not yet arrived.

The Dutch hoped to transport the kadjang with local boats before the Boswijck ship left. They planned to secure another 50 loads, expecting a better harvest next season.

Additionally, senior merchant Mattheus Schenckenbergh thanked the authorities for his promotion and received permission to temporarily transfer duties to Hendrick Steenkop (a merchant and fiscal officer) and Arnoldus Moll (an assistant merchant and designated garrison bookkeeper) while waiting for his replacement, Pieter de Bock from Amboina. After Steenkop handed over the cloth shop and small cash register to Joannes Hackart, the transfer of cash, the trading warehouse, and the main dispensary under the church was completed. Schenckenbergh finalized the business books by the end of March.

On 4 May 1697, officials in Makassar reported on efforts to salvage goods from a shipwreck and transport them to Banda using the sloops Waijer and Ceram. They noted the following key points:

• The sloops were originally meant to carry salvaged goods to Banda but were now being repurposed due to an unexpected event involving the ship Zilversteijn.
• Cash from the wreck would not be transported by sea. Instead, the Banda government was asked to withdraw the sum via a bill of exchange to ensure the money’s safety.
• Out of 92 remaining soldiers, only 25 were fit for duty. Many were either recruits, recently discharged, or unfit for service.
• The ship Domburgh was transporting 25 discharged soldiers, while another 24 unfit soldiers (excluding 4 from Zilversteijn) were also being sent away.
• Reinforcements (100 soldiers) had arrived via Boswijck and Domburgh, but around 80 experienced soldiers had been discharged due to expired contracts, weakening the garrison.
• The Zilversteijn incident also delayed sending Boswijck back immediately, as it had to stop near Tannekeke to unload cargo and gather drinking water for survivors.

The officials justified their changes to original orders, citing unforeseen circumstances beyond their control.

On 4 May 1697, a report from Makassar described the situation of the shipwrecked Zilversteijn. The ship had crashed, but most valuable items had already been saved. These included:

• 3 chests with 9,666¾ rijksdaalders (a type of coin) in cash,
• 23 packs of clothes,
• Various chests, pots, barrels, iron, copper, ropes, sails, and other supplies.

The items were listed in an attached document, but it was still unclear which goods belonged to the ship and which were meant for Banda. The condition of some items was also unknown and would be checked later.

The report noted that the Zilversteijn was not in immediate danger during the current southeast monsoon season but might not survive the first northwest storm. Meanwhile, the small ship Boswijck and borrowed boats could not risk going near the wreck due to the danger of being driven off course or meeting an accident.

Instead, a small sloop (a type of boat) that was only 10 to 12 feet deep would be sent to recover more items once it was ready. The ship’s carpenter had already found a safe anchoring spot for it.

Out of 214 people on board the Zilversteijn, the soldiers and sailors had first built a raft from beams, oars, and planks. 105 people climbed onto it and tried to reach the shore with a small boat leading the way. However, they would not have made it without the ship’s carpenter, who met them at sea with small boats. Many were half-submerged in the water due to the raft’s weight, so most were transferred to the boats. Around 25 people reached the Bay of Bankala on the south coast of the land on the raft. The wood from the raft was pulled ashore by skipper Theunis Ros and would later be picked up with a suitable boat (which they did not yet have).

Out of 100 soldiers meant for Banda, 96 arrived safely at the local garrison. They had traveled partly on a sloop owned by a Chinese captain named Ongwatko, partly on small boats, and partly overland. The group included:

• 2 sergeants,
• 2 corporals,
• 92 privates (called schildergasten in the text).

4 soldiers were missing and reported to have died on the Zilversteijn. Many of the soldiers had fallen ill during the ordeal but most had recovered.

On 4 May 1697, a letter and gift were collected for Radja Goa in Maccassar. His reply, along with 3 enslaved people, was sent back to the ship on 11 May. The messengers returned on 28 May, reporting that the earlier story (likely a complaint or accusation) was entirely false and exaggerated. Officials confirmed this on 15 May when Mabanij handed over a man named Torappa, chained for lying. Additional witnesses—Aroe Tenette Matoa and Aroe Mero—were sent on 20 May, but Torappa refused to speak. He was kept imprisoned until Aroe Ponij (expected back daily from Chinrana) could return to punish him.

Radja Goa received a letter and gift from Dutch authorities with great respect on 9 April. His reply, written in the Maccassarse and Malay languages, arrived on 2 May, accompanied by two elderly enslaved men and one enslaved Papuan woman as gifts. These were delivered to Domburgh on 3 May and handed to the ship’s captain, Evert T, for the Dutch officials.

Unusually harsh storms during the recent monsoon season (late 1696–early 1697) destroyed 7 or 8 local and Chinese ships near Maccassar, though most crews survived. Among the losses was a Dutch ship, the Bril, which sank between 29 and 30 March, along with its cargo, including silver stones meant for Banda. The storm’s severity was described as unprecedented in living memory.

Radja Goa had not yet shared the full contents of the Dutch letter with the governor, breaking past tradition. This change caused some tension in Bonij, though officials downplayed its significance. Another letter and gift for Aroe Ponij remained with the governor until his return.