Transcriptions » Recently created summaries of historical documents

On 4 May 1697, a report from Makassar discussed the harvest and purchase of green kadjang (a type of legume). Due to strong southeast winds, ships were ordered to anchor below De Drie Gebroeders (The Three Brothers) until fully loaded, but no later than 20 May, before continuing to Batavia.

The green kadjang crop in the Buginese highlands had failed badly for the second time because heavy rain washed away or ruined most of the seeds. The Dutch had already given the widow of the first Buginese queen 200 rijksdaalders (Dutch guilders) to secure 20 loads at 10 rijksdaalders per load. A sergeant in Bulukumba was also ordered to secure 30 loads at the same price. However, only about 12 loads were received from the Buginese region, and just 3 loads from Bulukumba, where around 50 loads of rice also remained. The lack of small boats (chialoupen) made it impossible to collect the grain, as the assigned boats had not yet arrived.

The Dutch hoped to transport the kadjang with local boats before the Boswijck ship left. They planned to secure another 50 loads, expecting a better harvest next season.

Additionally, senior merchant Mattheus Schenckenbergh thanked the authorities for his promotion and received permission to temporarily transfer duties to Hendrick Steenkop (a merchant and fiscal officer) and Arnoldus Moll (an assistant merchant and designated garrison bookkeeper) while waiting for his replacement, Pieter de Bock from Amboina. After Steenkop handed over the cloth shop and small cash register to Joannes Hackart, the transfer of cash, the trading warehouse, and the main dispensary under the church was completed. Schenckenbergh finalized the business books by the end of March.

On 4 May 1697, officials in Makassar reported on efforts to salvage goods from a shipwreck and transport them to Banda using the sloops Waijer and Ceram. They noted the following key points:

• The sloops were originally meant to carry salvaged goods to Banda but were now being repurposed due to an unexpected event involving the ship Zilversteijn.
• Cash from the wreck would not be transported by sea. Instead, the Banda government was asked to withdraw the sum via a bill of exchange to ensure the money’s safety.
• Out of 92 remaining soldiers, only 25 were fit for duty. Many were either recruits, recently discharged, or unfit for service.
• The ship Domburgh was transporting 25 discharged soldiers, while another 24 unfit soldiers (excluding 4 from Zilversteijn) were also being sent away.
• Reinforcements (100 soldiers) had arrived via Boswijck and Domburgh, but around 80 experienced soldiers had been discharged due to expired contracts, weakening the garrison.
• The Zilversteijn incident also delayed sending Boswijck back immediately, as it had to stop near Tannekeke to unload cargo and gather drinking water for survivors.

The officials justified their changes to original orders, citing unforeseen circumstances beyond their control.

On 4 May 1697, a report from Makassar described the situation of the shipwrecked Zilversteijn. The ship had crashed, but most valuable items had already been saved. These included:

• 3 chests with 9,666¾ rijksdaalders (a type of coin) in cash,
• 23 packs of clothes,
• Various chests, pots, barrels, iron, copper, ropes, sails, and other supplies.

The items were listed in an attached document, but it was still unclear which goods belonged to the ship and which were meant for Banda. The condition of some items was also unknown and would be checked later.

The report noted that the Zilversteijn was not in immediate danger during the current southeast monsoon season but might not survive the first northwest storm. Meanwhile, the small ship Boswijck and borrowed boats could not risk going near the wreck due to the danger of being driven off course or meeting an accident.

Instead, a small sloop (a type of boat) that was only 10 to 12 feet deep would be sent to recover more items once it was ready. The ship’s carpenter had already found a safe anchoring spot for it.

Out of 214 people on board the Zilversteijn, the soldiers and sailors had first built a raft from beams, oars, and planks. 105 people climbed onto it and tried to reach the shore with a small boat leading the way. However, they would not have made it without the ship’s carpenter, who met them at sea with small boats. Many were half-submerged in the water due to the raft’s weight, so most were transferred to the boats. Around 25 people reached the Bay of Bankala on the south coast of the land on the raft. The wood from the raft was pulled ashore by skipper Theunis Ros and would later be picked up with a suitable boat (which they did not yet have).

Out of 100 soldiers meant for Banda, 96 arrived safely at the local garrison. They had traveled partly on a sloop owned by a Chinese captain named Ongwatko, partly on small boats, and partly overland. The group included:

• 2 sergeants,
• 2 corporals,
• 92 privates (called schildergasten in the text).

4 soldiers were missing and reported to have died on the Zilversteijn. Many of the soldiers had fallen ill during the ordeal but most had recovered.

On 4 May 1697, a letter and gift were collected for Radja Goa in Maccassar. His reply, along with 3 enslaved people, was sent back to the ship on 11 May. The messengers returned on 28 May, reporting that the earlier story (likely a complaint or accusation) was entirely false and exaggerated. Officials confirmed this on 15 May when Mabanij handed over a man named Torappa, chained for lying. Additional witnesses—Aroe Tenette Matoa and Aroe Mero—were sent on 20 May, but Torappa refused to speak. He was kept imprisoned until Aroe Ponij (expected back daily from Chinrana) could return to punish him.

Radja Goa received a letter and gift from Dutch authorities with great respect on 9 April. His reply, written in the Maccassarse and Malay languages, arrived on 2 May, accompanied by two elderly enslaved men and one enslaved Papuan woman as gifts. These were delivered to Domburgh on 3 May and handed to the ship’s captain, Evert T, for the Dutch officials.

Unusually harsh storms during the recent monsoon season (late 1696–early 1697) destroyed 7 or 8 local and Chinese ships near Maccassar, though most crews survived. Among the losses was a Dutch ship, the Bril, which sank between 29 and 30 March, along with its cargo, including silver stones meant for Banda. The storm’s severity was described as unprecedented in living memory.

Radja Goa had not yet shared the full contents of the Dutch letter with the governor, breaking past tradition. This change caused some tension in Bonij, though officials downplayed its significance. Another letter and gift for Aroe Ponij remained with the governor until his return.

On 4 May 1697, a report from Makassar described the tense situation in Goa, which had prepared its defenses due to political conflicts. Aroe Ponij had left for Bugis because his father, Packa Koija, was seriously ill. The Dutch officials hoped their actions would be understood or at least forgiven, as they aimed to prevent greater unrest. Without intervention, Goa risked severe damage.

Aroe Ponij had arrived at the fortress on 8 March 1697 with a large group, requesting permission to visit his dying father in Bugis. The governor allowed his departure but refused his additional request for the first queen, Dain Talalille, to attend the funeral, citing her old age and the governor’s protective rights over her.

Upon hearing of his father’s death, the Dutch sent a traditional gift of 12 pieces of white cloth (lijwaat) via their Malay scribe, Intche Djenal. Meanwhile, Dain Mabanij, a prince from Soping (who had stayed in Bontuale), arrived on 4 April and urgently requested Dutch protection. He feared Aroe Ponij, who had summoned him to Soping for unclear reasons. The Dutch council granted his request on 5 March, allowing him to stay in Goa.

On 8 April, shocking news arrived: Aroe Ponij had imprisoned three minor kings from Belo, Pila, and Pisij. The Dutch sent Abraham Holscher (assistant merchant) and Pieter Pietersz (flag bearer) on 9 April to investigate and protest if the reports were confirmed.

The text from 4 May 1697 describes ongoing tensions between the kingdoms of Boni and Gowa in Macassar (modern-day Makassar, Indonesia). Here’s a summary of the key points:

• The conflict between Boni and Gowa continued, with Aroe Palakka (also called Aru Palaka) being recognized as the king of Boni for unclear reasons.
• The Dutch governor urged both sides to maintain peace, warning them (as had been done before) that the Dutch East India Company (the VOC) would support its own laws and rights in the region.
• Gowa claimed innocence in the conflict, but the hostility between the two kingdoms persisted. The VOC tried to reassure Gowa that they had nothing to fear, especially since Boni's military power had weakened after their forces scattered and their people were withdrawn.
• The VOC believed the balance of power had shifted enough to prevent Boni from taking further aggressive action, though they acknowledged that Boni’s intentions were still unpredictable.

The text also addresses criticism from another Dutch official (referred to as "uw Edelheden," or "Your Honors") in a letter dated 5 March 1697:

• This official disapproved of the VOC’s decision to recognize Aroe Palakka as king of Boni, fearing it would upset the balance further.
• The VOC defended its actions, arguing they acted based on the situation at the time and their best judgment to maintain peace and serve the company’s trade interests. They believed avoiding conflict—without damaging the VOC’s reputation—was the best approach.
• The VOC also mentioned the Treaty of Bongaya (referred to as "sopingh"), treating it as a settled matter, though the official found their handling of it too lenient.
• The VOC insisted they had shown proper respect and authority, forgiving the offense this time but warning that if such issues recurred, stronger measures—like calling on allies—would be necessary.
• They concluded that, based on experience, their approach had prevented greater harm.

On 4 May 1697, officials in Makassar reported to the Dutch council about the fall of Goa, which they believed could have been prevented. The people of Makassar expressed fear of an attack by the Buginese (people from Bone). The local ruler, Aroe Ponij, along with other nobles and two queen widows, thanked the Dutch East India Company (VOC) repeatedly for their pardon, reaffirming earlier promises of loyalty.

The VOC believed this show of gratitude maintained their authority and prevented further unrest—or even the complete ruin of Goa. The kingdom had been threatened by conflicts tied to the Buginese claims that the Makassares, particularly Radja Goa, were plotting to restore the exiled king To-isa (his brother-in-law) in the kingdom of Soping. Though the people of Goa had hinted at these concerns earlier (as recorded on 12, 15, and 22 November), they did so vaguely. A trusted source later revealed that Aroe Ponij had secretly warned Radja Goa through his nephew, Crain Bontolankas, that he was strengthening his position in Pamanjingan (a region inland behind Goa) and would join Radja Goa if needed.

Despite Goa's complaints, their fear of attack persisted. They even requested Dutch soldiers for protection (noted on 24 December of the previous year). Tensions grew when Aroe Ponij, in a meeting with the governor on 25 February, accused Goa of sending Crain Bonto Monompo to Bone to persuade Crain Toerongan to rebel. He presented a letter—written on palm leaves by Crain Toerongan's wife to Aroe Tanette Matoea—as proof. Though upset, the governor and council advised caution, urging Aroe Ponij not to jump to conclusions. When pressed, the governor refused to name the accuser, fearing it would escalate tensions further.

On 4 May 1697, a report from Makassar detailed the state of affairs among local allies, particularly focusing on tensions with the kingdom of Boni and the actions of Aroe Ponij (also called Aru Palaka). The report highlighted ongoing conflicts since October 1696, when Aroe Ponij had attacked the kingdom of Sopingh (also Suppa).

• Aroe Ponij claimed his actions were provoked by rebels from Sopingh, who allegedly ambushed him. He admitted breaking earlier agreements with the Dutch East India Company (VOC) but begged for forgiveness, promising loyalty and no further violations.
• Meanwhile, people from Boni used the conflict as an excuse to steal buffaloes belonging to the VOC's subjects in the Maros highlands, near Sopingh's borders. The VOC demanded and partially received restitution, though delays left some claims unresolved.
• Aroe Ponij had also summoned the dowager queen of Boni, Poetri Dain Tahalille, to Chinrana, but the VOC advised against this, urging him to return quickly to prevent further unrest. He arrived in Bontuale on 2 December 1696 and met with VOC officials the next day, where he justified his actions but ultimately admitted wrongdoing.

The report also mentioned unresolved discussions about the kingdom of Tambora, though time constraints prevented further decisions on that matter.

On 4 May 1693, a report from Makassar mentioned that Aroe Teko and Crain Jersmika remained on the island of Sumbawa against the wishes of their kings and the Dutch commanders. The area near Tambora had suffered greatly from war, with the land exhausted and many people scattered due to hunger. Despite this, Aroe Teko and Crain Jersmika stayed, claiming they had reasons similar to those in a letter sent from Lunn on 20 April to the governor.

The letter stated that Turelij Baramboe and Turelij Gampo (said to be uncles or brothers of the Raja of Tambora) had come with 80 men to join the Dutch and settle in Sumbawa. They accused these men of spreading lies. The letter also noted that 17 cannons had been captured:

• 9 from Tambora,
• 3 from Bima,
• 2 from Dompo,
• 3 from Kore or Sangar.

Another report from Makassar on 4 May 1697 mentioned that the Raja of Goa had sent a ship to Sumbawa without specifying the type or size of cannons. The ship was to wait for the governor’s orders, but the report only discussed large cannons, as the Raja of Goa knew the Sumbawa contracts were exclusively for the Dutch East India Company (VOC).

The kings of Boni and Goa were frustrated that their subjects were not fully obeying their commands and sought the VOC's authority to enforce compliance. The Raja of Goa sent a servant, Dain Madjene, to Sumbawa on 2 May to check on Crain Sevenika and encourage Crain Pomelikan to return. The servant was to report back in writing, which would then be forwarded to the Dutch officials.

• On 4 May 1697, a report from Macassar detailed the capture of Radja Tambora, who had tried to escape after breaking agreements. He was caught buying horses and cattle (likely to flee) and was arrested. His followers had already escaped, but Radja Tambora was found with 3–4 men and his wife, who was killed. He was chained and his possessions were seized.
• The governor of Macassar ordered the kings of Boni and Gowa to send Radja Tambora to the Dutch. After receiving the orders on 20 March, they handed him over on 28 April. He was imprisoned, questioned about breaking treaties, and given food by the company’s interpreter, Jan Ferdinandus. The Dutch debated next steps, as Radja Tambora had also wronged local allies.
• Another report from 4 May 1697 mentioned Adriaan ’t Hooft, who arrived from Bima with updates. The king of Dompo, Boemij Sorowo (previously called Turelij Baramboe), had been at war. The Dutch now controlled him and would consult the kings of Boni and Gowa before acting.
• Adriaan ’t Hooft delivered letters to leaders in Bima, Dompo, and Sumbawa:
  • Mappa Talij, the late king of Bima’s eldest son (still a minor), was chosen as successor.
  • The king of Sumbawa had handed power to his underage son.
  • Boemij Sorowo was now king of Dompo, though earlier reports had confused his name.
• The report noted that Boemij Sorowo was a "king without people" because Dompo was in chaos.

On 4 May 1697, officials in Makassar sent a letter to Governor-General Willem van Outhoorn and the Council of the Dutch East Indies in Batavia. They reported receiving two letters from Batavia: one from 29 December (arrived 15 January) via the yacht Boswijk, and another from 5 March (arrived 3 April) via the ship Domburgh.

The letter served as a guide for the Domburgh, which was sent ahead of the Boswijk to sail back via Tagal (Manila). It also provided a brief update on key events, focusing on the island of Sumbawa.

• The king of Tambora was now a prisoner, held in the castle in Makassar.
• His capture was made possible by the presence of Aroe Teko and Crain Jerenika in Kilo.
• The king had arrived in Kilo in February 1697 with around 20 armed men and some women, surrendering due to hunger.
• The kingdoms of Bima, Dompo, and Sumbawa were weak and unable to defend themselves, let alone attack the enemy stronghold in Madind without Dutch support.
• Though Adriaan 't Hooft had been sent to Bima with orders to take action, the king of Tambora was already captured before his arrival.

On 4 May 1697, a list of documents was sent from Makassar aboard the ship Domburgh, addressed to Willem van Outhoorn, the Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies in Batavia, and the Council of the Dutch East Indies. The documents included:

• A letter from Isaac van Rlije, a respected council member in Makassar, to Willem van Outhoorn, dated 4 May 1697.
• A copy of a letter from Isaac van Rlije to the Governor and Council in Banda, dated 23 April 1697.
• Instructions for two officials, Abraham Holscher (assistant merchant) and Pieter Pietersz (ensign), for their mission to Chinvana, dated 10 April 1697.
• A report by the same officials about their experiences during the mission, dated 28 April 1697.
• An invoice listing anchors and enslaved people sent on the Domburgh.
• A receipt signed by the ship’s captain, Evert Doetis, and accountant Jacob Suijker.
• An expense report for the ship, signed by the same two men.
• A list of Dutch East India Company (VOC) employees traveling on the ship.
• A list of discharged soldiers also traveling on the ship.
• A note about goods already recovered from the wreck of the Silversteijn.
• A cash box containing payroll books closed at the end of August in the previous year.
• A copy of a certificate about the decay and unusable condition of 50 wooden supports brought from Boswijck.
• A sealed bundle with accounts from VOC employees traveling outside the official payroll list.
• A response regarding corrections made for certain individuals.
• A letter from the King of Goa to Willem van Outhoorn, held by the ship’s captain, Evert Doetis.

The documents were signed in Makassar at Fort Rotterdam by Jacob Cuijcq van Mijrop, the secretary.

On 14 February 1697, a report was translated from Malay by Wan Muhammad and presented to Willem van Outhoorn, the Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies. The report detailed political conflicts in the kingdom of Soping (also called Suppa), as shared by a traveler named Tohamis from Makassar.

• The ruler of Boni, referred to as the Raja of Boni, had attacked Soping.
• The conflict began with a power struggle tied to a past agreement. The late Raja of Soping had given the former Raja of Boni authority to decide who would rule Soping after his death. The agreement stated:
  • If the chosen heir, To-Indziang (son of the late Raja of Soping), ruled poorly or unjustly, the Raja of Boni could remove him.
  • In that case, Raja Dijwata (another son of the late Raja of Soping) should replace him.
• After the Raja of Soping died, To-Indziang became ruler. Later, two officials from Soping, Mantrij Arongh Salatoemoe and Galarang Tobakij, complained to the Raja of Boni that To-Indziang was a bad ruler who oppressed his people.
• The Raja of Boni then removed To-Indziang and installed Raja Dijwata as the new ruler.
• After the Raja of Boni died, the same two officials, Arongh Salatoenoe and Galarang Tobakij, reinstated To-Indziang as ruler of Soping.
• The current Raja of Boni heard about this and attacked Soping. He killed Arongh Salatoenoe and Galarang Tobakij, removed To-Indziang again, and reinstated Raja Dijwata as ruler.

Tohamis shared this information with Wan Muhammad while still in Makassar and left Batavia on 2 February 1697.

• On 14 February 1697, a translated report from Han Muhammad, a servant of Willem van Outhoorn, the Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies, was submitted. The report shared news about the Macassars (people from Makassar).
• A man named Tokanis (likely a leader or messenger) arrived in Batavia in November 1696 with updates. He reported that the current ruler of Bone, called the Raja of Bone, had left to attack the Raja of Soppeng.
• Han Muhammad investigated why the Raja of Bone wanted to confront the Raja of Soppeng. According to Tokanis, he had only heard from people that when the father of the current Raja of Soppeng was ill, he had given a power-of-attorney document to the recently deceased Raja of Bone.
• The document stated: if the father died, the Raja of Bone should appoint his son, named To Indziangh, as the new Raja of Soppeng—but only if he ruled justly and fairly. If To Indziangh ruled poorly, causing harm to his people, the Raja of Bone had the authority to remove him.

On 4 May 1697, a financial report from Makassar (in the Rotterdam Castle) was settled, including expenses for Domburg totaling ƒ414. Most of these costs were for Opperkoopman Schenckenberg and Coopman Caas.

The letter was signed by:

• Isaac van Thije
• Mattheus Schenkenbergh
• Hendrick Steenkop
• Pieter Scipion
• Abraham Holscher
• Aarnold Moll
• Ioannes Hackart

A note explained that Underkoopman Abraham Holscher and Vaandrager Pieter Pietersz should follow instructions for dealing with Aroe Ponij in Boni.

The reason for this report was the death of the old king of Boni on 6 April 1696. The current king, then called Aroe Palacca (or Lapatauw), was named successor with the support of the Aroe Pitoes (electors). Though the Dutch East India Company (VOC) had not originally planned this, they accepted it for peace, hoping the new king would seek good advice. He was crowned in Boni on 6 October 1696 with the VOC’s approval.

However, conflicts arose when Soping rejected Queen Regent Trowatoe and reinstated her brother, the deposed king To-Isa. This led to tensions, and the new king, Aroe Ponij, soon faced war.

On 4 April 1697, a letter was written from the Castle Rotterdam in Makassar by officials including Isaac van Thije (governor and director), Mattheus Schenckenberg, Hendrick Steenkop, Pieter Schipion, Arnoldus Moll, and Joannes Hakkert. They instructed someone (likely a merchant or envoy) to return quickly and provide a truthful written report about their mission. This report was needed so the officials could properly advise their superiors ("welgemelte haar Edelheden"). The letter ended with well-wishes and was signed by the group.

The document was later verified on 4 May 1697 by Iacob Cuijk van Mijerop, the secretary, who confirmed its accuracy.

Attached to the letter was a report by Abraham Holscher (a junior merchant, or "onderkoopman") and Pieter Pietersz (an ensign, or "vaandrig"). They described their encounters and activities during their journey by sea, land, freshwater lake ("Verse-meir"), and river.

On 4 May 1697, a letter was sent from Makassar to the Dutch authorities in Batavia (modern-day Jakarta). The document was a translated message from the ruler of Gowa, Paduka Sri Sultan Fakar al-Eddin Abdul Dzialiel, and his high-ranking officials. It was addressed to the Dutch Governor-General and the Council of the Dutch East Indies.

• The letter was a declaration of sincere friendship and loyalty, filled with good wishes.
• Paduka Sri Sultan Fakar al-Eddin Abdul Dzialiel and his officials praised the Dutch leaders for their just and wise rule, which brought peace and prosperity to all under their authority.
• They expressed hope that God would grant long life and happiness to the Governor-General and the Council, so they could continue to protect and support both foreigners and their own people.
• The letter also acknowledged receipt of a previous message and gifts from the Dutch, which were described as generous and splendid.

The document was prepared by Dutch officials in Makassar, including Abraham Holscher, Pieter Pietersen, and Jacob Cuijk van Mijerop, the secretary. It was originally written in Malay and later translated for the Dutch authorities.

On 4 May 1697, a report from Makassar noted that two representatives from the Dutch East India Company (VOC) were treated as allies under contract, but they could not respond further to a local ruler’s request. They agreed to wait for three princes from Soping to appear, as promised by His Highness (the ruler of Makassar), who would summon them through his messenger. The ruler also insisted these princes should be brought before the Governor at the castle, where the false accuser (unnamed) could be confronted. The VOC representatives claimed they did not know this person’s identity but mentioned that Her Highness Daeng Talilis’s servant, Sandewi, had been present when the report was given to the governor. The ruler expected the truth to come out once the accusations were proven false.
• On 18 May 1697, Aroe Bela, sent by Raja Boni (a local ruler), arrived and reported that Aroe Piesie was not in Soping but had gone to the village of Lauriesangh (under the authority of Sauitoe), while Aroe Bila had left for Tonpandang to visit his wife. This was due to alleged mistreatment by the three aforementioned individuals.
• The accused parties, when questioned on 4 May 1697, denied all wrongdoing. They claimed Raja Boni had treated them kindly, given them a friendly farewell, and permitted them to leave for their homelands 7 days earlier (on 11 May 1697).
• Since Raja Boni’s messenger (Aroe Bela) had already been heard, and the ruler’s positive testimony about him—along with the ruler’s own offer to bring the three princes to the castle—had built enough trust, the VOC representatives decided not to push further demands from their instructions. They avoided causing delays in the ruler’s planned return journey, as permitted by his license.
• On 24 May 1697, since Aroe Piesie and Aroe Bila still had not appeared, the VOC representatives departed with Raja Boni’s permission and a formal farewell. They left by water and land around 10 AM, retracing their original route.

On 4 May 1697, officials in the fort at Makassar reported the following events:

• They were waiting for Raja Bonij to arrive in Bontuale as usual, so they could escort him to read a letter and discuss important matters with the governor and council.
• A surprising report arrived about an attack by Raja Bonij on three nobles from Soping: Arou Bela, Aroe Biela, and Aroe Piesi. According to the report:
  • On 3 May, Raja Bonij allegedly ordered an ambush near Tanroen by armed men under Lieutenant Poanna Wandjang.
  • The first two nobles were captured, and the third was wounded in the shoulder.
  • They were taken to the village of Timoeroe.
  • The attack resulted in the deaths of 13 people from Soping (who tried to protect their leaders) and 3 from Bonij.
• However, a messenger from Timoeroe arrived six days before the report, claiming that Arou Bela was unharmed and in good standing with Raja Bonij. This contradiction confused the governor and council.
• To verify the truth, the officials decided to send a delegation to Raja Bonij before the news could spread to Batavia (modern-day Jakarta).
• When questioned, Raja Bonij responded angrily, insisting:
  • He would bring the nobles before them in three days to prove they were safe.
  • While Aroe Piesi was injured, it happened long ago and was not serious.
  • Even if the attack had happened, it was irrelevant because both Soping and Bonij were under his rule.

The governor and council then sent a reply through the messenger, expressing their hopes for a resolution under the authority of the Dutch East India Company (VOC).

This document contains records from 1697 related to the Dutch presence in Amboina (modern Ambon, Indonesia).

• A court verdict was issued by the local Dutch colonial court in Amboina on 27 June 1697 against several leaders and villagers from the settlement of Tenga Tenga.
• A report by Corporal Joannes Brust and soldier Matthijs Clement, stationed at the trading post in Harouco (modern Haruku), dated 30 April 1697, described the escape of 8 households from the village of Hatasoua into the mountains.
• Residents of the village Lissabatta submitted a complaint to Governor Willem van Wijngaarden and the colonial council in Amboina, accusing the local leader (called orangkaya) of Nonialij of wrongdoing.
• A letter from Governor Willem van Wijngaarden and the council in Amboina was sent to the Dutch colonial government in Batavia (modern Jakarta) on 12 October 1697.
• A response by Councilor Dirk de Haas was written on 25 September 1697, addressing concerns about the decline in clove harvests, as discussed in a previous letter to the government in Batavia.

The following documents were received in Amboina (now Ambon, Indonesia) between June 6 and October 11, 1697, detailing events and reports from local officials to the higher government in Batavia (now Jakarta, Indonesia):

• A letter from Willem van Wijngaarden, Extraordinary Council and Governor of Amboina, along with the local council, sent to the "High Government" in Batavia on May 2, 1697.
• A complaint by Cornelis Stull, Chief Merchant, regarding 250 gold cobang coins lost at sea when the ship Htobre ter Rheede sank near Amboina in the previous year. The complaint was dated May 20, 1697.
• A report by Cornelis Stull, submitted to Willem van Wijngaarden, summarizing key events in Amboina during his time in authority.
• A daily log by Pieter Nuijts, Junior Merchant, handed over to the temporary governor Cornelis Stull on November 2, 1696. It described the destruction of clove trees along the north coast of Ceram (now Seram, Indonesia).
• A statement by former fiscal officer Jan van Hoorn on May 13, 1697, explaining why he did not start legal proceedings against de Haas, the commander of the Chialoup (a type of ship), for capturing a vessel from Massoal.
• A short letter from Willem van Wijngaarden and the council in Amboina to the High Government in Batavia, dated May 30, 1697.
• A letter from Willem van Wijngaarden and the council in Amboina to the High Government in Batavia, dated September 25, 1697, including a note on recently destroyed clove trees in areas such as Alang, Lileboij, and Hatou. A total of 9 trees were cut down, with an additional 182 trees discovered and destroyed in the Hila district.
• A report by appointed officials on their mission to Tengatenga to resolve conflicts within the village, dated March 13, 1697.

The records were formally registered in Amboina in 1697.

On 4 May 1697, a Dutch delegation arrived in Makassar and was warmly welcomed by Tori Wadjo and local leaders. They were seated on chairs placed on raised platforms and met with the ruler, referred to as "his highness," along with nobles from the Bugis people. The group included a Dutch East India Company (VOC) clerk acting as an interpreter, who formally delivered greetings from the governor and council in Batavia (modern-day Jakarta).

The Dutch requested lodging due to fatigue from their journey, which was granted. They were given a notable residence belonging to Aroe Tanete Matona, with assurances that all necessary supplies—food, sleeping arrangements, and other essentials—would be provided according to local customs. During this time, they learned that the king’s father, Poanna Packakoija, had died 29 days earlier in the region of Timoroe and had been buried with full honors by the leading nobles of the Bone Kingdom.

The delegation was also told that the king had already sent messengers to fetch his best ships upon hearing from his captain, Boelo, that a Dutch ship from Batavia had arrived at the castle in Souwandang. Additionally, the king had been informed by another messenger, Toenanga, about the Dutch arrival before the delegation’s own meeting with him.

On 16 May, the Dutch were summoned by the king through the interpreter Toumar and the noble Sabandhaar to explain the purpose of their visit. They revealed that the ship Domburg had arrived, carrying letters and gifts from the Dutch governor and council. These gifts were to be formally presented with proper ceremony, following the advice of local officials in Bantuale.

On 4 May 1693, a group departed from Makassar after receiving instructions and saying farewell. They traveled by boat, provided by Radja Bonij, and arrived near Padang on 13 May. The next morning, they continued their journey overland with 20 porters and 19 horses, crossing mountains called Bolisicappa toward the village of Waetchepi. They arrived around 3 PM, noting the village was fortified with a square wall and four stone towers, about 7 feet high and the size of Castle Rotterdam.

From there, they were quickly transported to the village of Boelebangie and then continued by boat across Tempe, under the rule of Touwadjo, toward Sindrana in Bone. On 14 May, they set off in four large canoes, crossing Lake Tamparongh Labadjo and passing the village of Trrewatta. They reached Tempe around 5 PM and stayed until midnight, when the canoes and crew were replaced. They traveled downriver and arrived near Sindrana around noon on 15 May.

There, they were received by Boules Sabandhaar Tomassa, a high-ranking official, who provided them with horses. They were then escorted by him to Radja Bonij, whose residence stood on about 90 large wooden pillars. The house was wide and long, surrounded by a strong river, with a fort nearby. The fort had three towers, about 11 feet high, made of stone and coated with lime. Additional defenses included two square towers and a third tower about a pistol-shot away, though the area was not suitable for heavy weapons.

During this visit, they were also introduced to Aroe Matavia (also called Aroe Marripo), the ruler of Toriwadjo.

On 20 July 1679, officials in Makassar discussed concerns about potential attacks and how to defend themselves if needed. They worried that if war broke out that year, their army of 2,600 soldiers, already in the field, might struggle during the rainy season (expected in 3 to 4 months). This could force them to retreat, making it difficult to regroup later. They also feared that more enemies, called bomiforo, might join the fight over time, creating bigger problems.

The council considered sending extra ships to Bima (besides the Chialoup Japara, which was already planned for salt and supplies). They decided to send the Jachtie Rotterdam, a ship they could spare, to block enemy supply routes by water and destroy their coastal water sources. They also wanted to encourage the kings of Bima and Dompo to take more interest in defending themselves.

After hearing reports from experienced officials—E. de Bocq, Mr. van Daalen, and Prins—who knew the area, including the mountain Caloncon, the council realized their defenses were weak. Unable to make a quick decision, they postponed further discussion until a later meeting.

The next morning, they decided to send the Jachtie Rotterdam and the Chialoup Japara within 4 to 5 days. On board would be:

• Adriaan van Daalen (a merchant and fiscal officer),
• 18 selected soldiers,
• 3 corporals,
• Sergeant Michiel Verlicht,
• A constable with 2 small cannons and a mortar (to launch bombs and fireworks into enemy camps).

Their mission was to end the unrest in Bima—either through negotiation or force—after the conflicts had dragged on for too long. They hoped for success with God’s help.

On 20 July 1679, a report from Maccassar described the ongoing conflict near Caloncon. The enemy forces, struggling to get supplies, couldn’t easily access fresh water from the mountain. Instead, they had to dig wells inland during high tide to collect drinking water, but when the tide receded, the wells turned salty and brackish.

When asked if Dutch ships and guns could cut off this water supply to force a surrender, it was clear that doing so would quickly end the war. The conflict had already lasted about 4 years. The King of Tambora had earlier requested help from the Dutch fiscal officer Sir van Daaben, but the Dutch had refused, believing the people of Biema should handle the situation themselves. The kings of Biema and Dompe had promised to support the King of Tambora.

A man named Crain Jernicka reported that he had seen inside Caloncon and estimated the enemy forces at around 500 people. He had advised the enemy leader, Bomifiro, to surrender to the Dutch East India Company (VOC) and make peace with the King of Tambora, but they showed no interest.

After hearing this, the Dutch president called a council meeting. They reviewed treaties with the kings of Biira and the King of Tambora’s agreement with the VOC from 22 July 1675. Key points included:

• Article 13: The King of Tambora must treat the VOC’s enemies as his own and provide help when needed.
• Article 17: The King of Tambora placed himself and his lands under VOC protection, recognizing them as his defenders.

The VOC, in turn, accepted this obligation and promised to protect the King of Tambora against any threats.